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INCLUSIONARY TAKINGS LEGISLATION
GERALD S. DICKINSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
EMINENT domain takings for economic development and blight re-moval frequently threaten to raze low-cost housing and displace the
poor and low-income communities from certain areas in a locality while
excluding them from others.1  Some scholars have proposed judicial im-
position by way of new doctrine, such as exclusionary eminent domain
doctrine, to alleviate this problem.2  Other scholars have opted for an or-
ganic voluntary “land assembly process,” such as inclusionary eminent do-
main, which posits “multiple tools to help guide municipalities, private
developers, and [low-income] communities construct or preserve afforda-
ble housing within economic redevelopment projects” born from eminent
domain takings.3  However, absent from the conceptual equation of these
proposals is a legislative remedy.  Indeed, the enactment of “inclusionary
takings legislation” would strengthen the prescriptive value of these or-
ganic and doctrinal solutions.  Such a proposal responds to the problems
posed by post-Kelo v. City of New London4 state-reform efforts that bar or
restrict eminent domain takings for economic development, yet left loop-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.  The
author thanks Mitchell Crusto Nestor Davidson, Sheila Foster, Rose Carmen
Goldberg, Timothy Mulvaney, Wendell Pritchett, Courtlyn Roser-Jones, George
Taylor, and Christopher Tyson for helpful comments and suggestions.
1. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 521–22 (2005) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); Dick M. Carpenter & John K. Ross, Testing O’Connor and Thomas: Does
the Use of Eminent Domain Target Poor and Minority Communities?, 46 URB. STUD.
2447, 2449–50 (2009); David Dana, The Law and Expressive Meaning of Condemning
the Poor After Kelo, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 365 (2007); Matthew J. Parlow, Unintended
Consequences: Eminent Domain and Affordable Housing, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 841,
861 (2006); Ilya Somin, Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings
After Kelo, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 183, 254 n.373 (2007); Ilya Somin, Is Post-Kelo
Reform Bad for the Poor?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1931, 1936 (2007); Ilya Somin, The
Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100, 2151
n.251 (2009) (citing Somin, supra, at 254 n.373).
2. See David A. Dana, Exclusionary Eminent Domain, 17 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 7, 8
(2009) (introducing “exclusionary eminent domain” as phenomenon that “dis-
place[s] residents [who] are unable to afford new housing in the same neighbor-
hood or locality as their now-condemned, former homes,” and thus excludes
families from both their homes and their home neighborhood, and proposing ex-
clusionary eminent domain doctrine by “heightened [judicial] review” of takings
that cause loss of affordable housing).
3. See Gerald S. Dickinson, Inclusionary Eminent Domain, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
845, 846–47 (2014) (introducing concept of “inclusionary eminent domain”).
4. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
(135)
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holes for blight removal condemnations that invariably target poor neigh-
borhoods in localities.
This Article focuses on state legislatures because they are primary in-
stitutional players that may be best equipped to reframe the takings power
for the general welfare of low-income communities affected by condemna-
tion.  Justice Stevens’s opinion in Kelo provides such a blueprint.  He
noted that the ruling did not “preclude[ ] any State from placing further
restrictions on its exercise of the takings power” and that eminent domain
statutes could limit the grounds upon which takings may be exercised.5
Indeed, in the post-Kelo era, state legislatures—as opposed to Congress or
local municipalities—were at the forefront of eminent domain reform.
Following that decision, the nation witnessed one of its most expansive
reforms of the public use vein of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.
Within several years, forty-two state legislatures “have enacted post-Kelo re-
form laws” to “either ban . . . or significantly restrict” the exercise of emi-
nent domain in some capacity.6
The amendments, however, were mostly cosmetic solutions because a
variety of blight removal exceptions remained intact in many jurisdictions,
effectively allowing municipalities to continue exercising takings for eco-
nomic development under the veil of blight removal and thereby achiev-
ing broader development goals.7  Indeed, creating affordable housing for
the poor and alleviating displacement were never high on the priority list
for advocates against the expansion of economic development as a public
use.  State legislatures, in amending eminent domain codes, likewise
missed an opportunity to bring affordable housing to the forefront of the
legislative debate on the abuse of eminent domain.  As Matthew Parlow
notes, the Kelo decision did nothing to “stem the tide of affordable hous-
ing casualties of eminent domain . . . .  [M]any states have responded to
Kelo [sic] by introducing blight-only legislation that will ultimately reduce
the availability of affordable housing.”8
Thus, this Article proposes an alternative post-Kelo legislative reform
effort called “inclusionary takings.”  Like inclusionary zoning legislation,
inclusionary takings legislation would trigger remedial affordable housing
action to mitigate the phenomenon of exclusionary condemnations in
dense urban areas and declining suburban localities.  An inclusionary tak-
ings statute would also mandate that local municipalities and private devel-
opers provide affordable housing in new developments benefiting from
eminent domain takings.  Such a statute may ameliorate the phenomenon
of exclusionary condemnations in dense urban areas that displaces low-
5. See id. at 489.
6. See Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, supra
note 1, at 2105, 2120. Since Somin’s article, the number of states has increased
from thirty-six to forty-two.
7. See id. at 2120.
8. See Parlow, supra note 1, at 860 (citing statutes from Alabama, California,
Massachusetts, New York, Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin as examples).
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income families from urban neighborhoods.9  An inclusionary taking, like
inclusionary zoning, in other words, requires affordable housing contribu-
tions from developers as a means of dealing with perennial problems asso-
ciated with housing shortages in urban and suburban localities.10
This Article demonstrates how legislatively-mandated affordable hous-
ing requirements, such as evidence of an affordable housing plan, during
condemnation proceedings may offer a more robust legal mechanism
under the law for triggering affordable housing development in economic
development projects, while simultaneously facilitating a collaborative and
inclusive process of land assembly between the developer, community, and
municipality.
Part II discusses the history and purpose behind the enactment of
inclusionary zoning laws, including the first of its kind in Virginia and the
famous Mount Laurel saga in New Jersey.  These examples served as the
impetus for other states, such as California, to exercise police power to
spur affordable housing construction in both suburban and urban locali-
ties in an effort to mitigate the exclusionary effects of zoning.  Part II also
discusses how inclusionary zoning laws have been subject to and, for the
most part survived, regulatory takings and exactions challenges.
Part III posits that states’ police power to exercise eminent domain is
similarly positioned to achieve inclusionary housing results.  Here, the Ar-
ticle draws parallels between the exclusionary effects of zoning and emi-
nent domain, concluding that state legislatures should amend existing or
enact new eminent domain statutes by placing conditions on the exercise
of eminent domain, such as affordable housing requirements, in order for
municipalities and developers to bypass post-Kelo restrictions on economic
development and mitigate the impact of blight removal exceptions on
poor and minority neighborhoods.  Part IV assesses the constitutionality of
inclusionary takings by discussing regulatory and exaction obstacles that
state legislatures and local municipalities may face in enacting such laws.
II. INCLUSIONARY ZONING LEGISLATION
Robert Ellickson’s well-received “irony of inclusionary zoning” schol-
arship sparked a debate that, even today, adequately summarizes the de-
bates between proponents and opponents regarding the usefulness of
land use devices to cure socio-economic and racial segregation and pro-
duce affordable housing.11  Do land use devices that serve to better the
living conditions of the poor invariably help or harm the very people the
policies seek to benefit, and is it within the domain of the market, the
state, or the courts to help cure those problems?
9. See Dana, supra note 2, at 7–8.
10. See id. at 7–11 (discussing need for municipalities to require available af-
fordable housing).
11. See generally Robert C. Ellickson, The Irony of “Inclusionary” Zoning, 54 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1167 (1981).
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The Post-War Era housing market drove local municipalities to cap-
ture the tax revenue advantages of exclusionary zoning by placing restric-
tions on the minimum floor area or lot size for residential structures,
which inflated the value of the property and effectively excluded the poor
and, by extension, racial minorities from the suburbs.12  These land use
regulations were manipulated partially in response to what some call social
and economic zoning.  While racial zoning had been struck down, exclu-
sionary zoning was far less explicit in its motives.13  But exclusionary zon-
ing did, nonetheless, achieve the same exclusionary results as explicit
racial zoning.14  The poor, in response to increasing segregation and con-
centrated poverty, sought to combat the exclusionary phenomenon of
zoning through litigation that led to inclusionary zoning legislation.15
Inclusionary zoning laws were conceived in an attempt to quell the
exclusionary nature of zoning and alleviate affordable housing shortages
through several voluntary and mandatory zoning devices, such as density
bonuses, set-aside schemes, in-lieu fees, linkage fees, fee waivers, and fast-
track permitting.16  The ordinances were justified by legislatures as essen-
tial to the public welfare because municipalities were already obligated,
under the police power, to ensure the health, safety, and welfare of their
residents.  This obligation included utilizing the scarce commodity of land
by regulating the land to encourage the construction of low-cost housing.
Indeed, an exodus of middle and working-class populations from the ur-
ban core left behind an “underclass” of Americans who lacked access to
safe and adequate affordable housing, as well as jobs, because much of
these commodities and opportunities had moved to the suburbs.17  As a
result, municipalities, facing housing shortages for the poor, particularly
in the suburbs, were compelled to take action to ameliorate this problem
when it became apparent through intense impact litigation that the poor
12. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Pro-
tection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767, 780–85 (1969).
13. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 76–77 (1917) (noting Fourteenth
Amendment “speaks in general terms” and that “[a]ny state action that denies this
immunity to a colored man is in conflict with the Constitution”).  The ordinance at
issue in Buchanan sought to make “reasonable provisions requiring . . . the use of
separate blocks, for residences, places of abode . . . by white and colored people
respectively.” See id. at 70.
14. See id. at 80 (noting effect of discriminatory ordinance “was to destroy the
right of the individual to acquire, enjoy, and dispose of his property”); see also
Camille Zubrinsky Charles, The Dynamics of Racial Residential Segregation, 29 ANN.
REV. SOC. 167, 197 (2003) (discussing effects of housing discrimination).
15. See ALEX F. SCHWARTZ, HOUSING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 224–25 (2d
ed. 2010); see also generally Harold A. McDougall, The Judicial Struggle Against Exclu-
sionary Zoning: The New Jersey Paradigm, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 625 (1979) (ex-
amining New Jersey Supreme Court’s reaction to exclusionary zoning).
16. See Dickinson, supra note 3, at 873–81 (discussing “tools of inclusionary
zoning”).
17. See generally WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE IN-
NER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987) (analyzing effects of exodus
of working class families from inner city and causes of social dislocation).
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were indeed being left behind in deteriorating, slum-like urban areas
while simultaneously being excluded from desirable localities in the
suburbs.18
The inflation of land costs, along with low-density criteria and costs
associated with land use approvals, subdivision fees, and other exactions
made it arguably fiscally impossible for developers to construct low-cost
housing for those left behind from the urban exodus; thus, inclusionary
zoning ordinances attempted to fill this gap.19  The ordinances, by virtue
of increasing production of low-cost housing, resulted in the “dispersal” or
“overconcentration” of low-cost housing.20  Inclusionary zoning ordi-
nances have the effect of dispersing such concentrated poverty by requir-
ing various percentages of low-cost units within new development projects
without any real boundary restrictions.21  Thus, the goal is for new devel-
opment in the most northern area of a metropolitan city, for example, to
produce some affordable units while a predominantly suburban enclave
south of an urban center will also provide inclusionary units, thereby de-
concentrating the poor.22
Virginia became the first state to implement inclusionary zoning
laws.23  In Fairfax County, for example, the nation’s first inclusionary zon-
ing ordinance required development of “fifty or more [multi-family]
units” to provide “not less than 6 percent low income dwelling units and
not less than an additional 9 percent moderate income dwelling units.”24
The ordinance, like many inclusionary ordinances today, offered develop-
ers “a density bonus,” which permitted one additional market rate unit for
every two low- or moderate-income units built and also allowed for devel-
opers to fulfill the affordability requirements by relying on subsidies.25
The Mount Laurel decisions in New Jersey also led to one of the na-
tion’s first inclusionary zoning laws.  New Jersey courts are, to this day,
heralded by some for the progressive nature in which they struck down
exclusionary zoning ordinances that violated state constitutional and zon-
18. See Thomas Kleven, Inclusionary Ordinances—Policy and Legal Issues in Re-
quiring Private Developers to Build Low Cost Housing, 21 UCLA L. REV. 1432, 1435
(1974) (noting effect of many land use regulations is to “prevent lower income
people and minorities from living [in the suburbs]” and that “[l]ower income
households and minorities have had little choice but to remain in the urban cen-
ters which have deteriorated rapidly”).
19. See id. at 1436.
20. See id. at 1437.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 1458.
23. The two counties to implement the schemes included Fairfax County, Vir-
ginia, and Montgomery County, Maryland. See id.; see also Robert W. Burchell &
Catherine C. Galley, Inclusionary Zoning: Pros and Cons, NEW CENTURY HOUSING,
Oct. 2000, at 3, 4; J. Gregory Richards, Zoning for Direct Social Control, 1982 DUKE
L.J. 761, 830–31.
24. See Kleven, supra note 18, at 1439.
25. See id. at 1440 (citing Amendment 156, June 30, 1971, COUNTY OF FAIRFAX,
VA., Code ch. 30, §§ 30-2.2.2, 2c).
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ing-enabling laws.  Such exclusionary ordinances barred multi-family resi-
dential developments and permitted only large-lot, single-family homes
that could ordinarily be owned by middle-class families.  These ordinances
exacerbated segregation by class and race.  In the aftermath of the Mount
Laurel litigation, New Jersey courts required every “developing municipal-
ity” to remedy housing shortages that led to class- and race-based segrega-
tion by providing a realistic opportunity for adequate housing for its poor
by loosening zoning ordinances and actively subsidizing a fair share num-
ber of units needed immediately and in the future.26  Inclusionary zoning
laws were one of several land use regulations enacted to fulfill these
obligations.
But critics of inclusionary zoning, such as Ellickson, explain that the
“irony” of the law is that it harms the very people it purports to help be-
cause beneficiaries of the policy who obtain such housing in the suburbs
may feel out of place, looked down upon, and reserved to a status of the
“other” in wealthier white suburbs.27  Others argue that developers do not
have enough incentive to commit to building in overly-regulated localities
and, therefore, will look elsewhere for development opportunities; this
practice results in less affordable housing, aggravates housing shortages,
and becomes “self-defeating” by creating another form of exclusionary
zoning.28  Apart from policy considerations, inclusionary zoning has also
been met with constitutional skepticism by some courts.
While Virginia was the first state to implement inclusionary zoning
laws, it was, ironically, the first to strike down the ordinances as regulatory
takings.29  The Virginia Supreme Court found that the Fairfax County in-
clusionary zoning ordinance30 violated the takings clause of the Virginia
Constitution when Virginia exceeded its authority under the state ena-
bling legislation.31  The court acknowledged that it “appear[ed] that pro-
viding low and moderate income housing serves a legitimate public
26. See generally S. Burlington Cty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Twp. of Mount Laurel (Mount
Laurel II), 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983).
27. See generally Ellickson, supra note 11.
28. See Lawrence Berger, Inclusionary Zoning Devices as Takings: The Legacy of the
Mount Laurel Cases, 70 NEB. L. REV. 186, 212 (1991).
29. See supra note 23.
30. See Kleven, supra note 18, at 1436–39.  Zoning laws that directly targeted
social and economic issues—or, as J. Gregory Richards states, “direct social con-
trol”—such as inclusionary zoning, were implemented by mostly suburban munici-
palities to avoid exclusionary zoning litigation, satisfy the housing needs of retiring
residents or adult children of present residents, or attract lower-paid workers
needed in the relevant area with appropriate housing opportunities. See id. at
1439; see also Richards, supra note 23, at 799–807; Jerome G. Rose, The Mandatory
Percentage of Moderately Priced Dwelling Ordinance (MPMPD) Is the Latest Technique of
Inclusionary Zoning, 3 REAL EST. L.J. 176 (1974).
31. See Bd. of Supervisors v. DeGroff Enters., Inc., 198 S.E.2d 600, 602 (Va.
1973).  The ordinance required a developer who constructed a development of
more than fifty units to set aside “at least [fifteen] percent of [those units] as low
and moderate income housing” in response to Fairfax County’s “uncontroverted
evidence” showing a strong need for 10,500 low-cost units. See id. at 601.
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purpose” because it attempts to provide for the health, safety, and welfare
of the residents, but that previous exclusionary ordinances had been
struck down because they “depriv[ed] . . . owner[s] the beneficial use of
[ ] property,” which acted more like a “confiscatory” practice.32  Thus, the
court said that such practices did not permit local governments to “control
compensation for the use of lands” and that requiring fifteen percent af-
fordable units exceeded the authority granted by the zoning enabling
act.33
However, the court decided that such ordinances were equally prob-
lematic, not because the purpose was for the general welfare of the poor,
but rather unconstitutional because it unfairly targeted developers “with-
out just compensation.”34  The court was concerned with the nature and
effect of the inclusionary mechanism on the developer, stating that “[o]f
greater importance . . . the [ordinance] . . . violates the guarantee . . . that
no property will be taken or damaged for public purposes without just
compensation.”35  Fairfax County reverted to a voluntary inclusionary zon-
ing law to avoid the uncompensated takings issue.
The mandatory inclusionary devices also triggered regulatory takings
challenges in Mount Laurel II.  But unlike the Virginia Supreme Court, the
New Jersey Supreme Court made curt treatment of the challenge, re-
jecting the uncompensated takings claims and upholding the required set-
aside schemes.36  The court found that the Mount Laurel doctrine—which
provides for a “realistic opportunity for the construction of lower cost
housing” through inclusionary devices such as “mandatory set-aside pro-
grams,” density bonuses or in-lieu fees—was “constitutional and within the
zoning power of a municipality.”37  Relying on prior takings challenges,
the court said if the permitted use under the zoning ordinance was “re-
lated to the physical use of the land,” then courts would dismiss confisca-
tory takings claims.38  In other words, a zoning ordinance that permitted
32. See id.
33. See id. at 602.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d 390, 444, 448 (N.J. 1983) (holding inclusio-
nary zoning ordinances constitute neither taking nor substantive due process viola-
tion).  Inclusionary zoning also has been attacked on grounds of due process and
equal protection.
37. See id. at 447–48.
38. See id. at 448.  The Mount Laurel II court reasoned that if a limitation per-
mitting only mobile homes for the elderly suffices,
then the comparable special need of lower income families for housing,
and its impact on the general welfare, could justify a district limited to
such use and certainly one of lesser restriction that requires only that
multi-family housing within a district include such use (the equivalent of a
mandatory set-aside).  Since the objective here goes beyond serving the
special needs of a particular class of citizens for the general welfare and
extends to the fulfillment of a constitutional obligation, the constitution-
ality of such devices, and the power of the municipality to impose them, is
even clearer.
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only “mobile homes for the elderly,” for example, was justified under the
police power because “the special housing needs of the elderly served the
general welfare.”39  Likewise, the court reasoned that inclusionary zoning
ordinances were no different, even if they focused on remedying social
and economic patterns of segregation and concentrated poverty.40  If
deep, concentrated poverty and access to affordable housing were key to
the general welfare of the residents located within the municipality, then a
land use regulation that triggered more affordable housing would be satis-
fied under general police powers and would survive regulatory takings
challenges.
It did not matter to the New Jersey Supreme Court that landowners or
builders were compelled to engage in an economic activity—construction
of affordable housing—they otherwise would not have engaged in initially.
The goal of these “economically efficient operator[s]” was “to obtain a
‘just and reasonable’ return on . . . investment.”41  The developer must
show that the inclusionary unit requirement will return a profit “so low as
to amount to a taking.”42  Thus, without more than some depreciation in
value or some decrease in profit that “effectuate[s] a deprivation of prop-
erty,” courts have found inclusionary zoning to pass constitutional muster
under a regulatory takings theory.43  California, too, has been a model for
inclusionary zoning laws.
The Cities of Napa and San Jose enacted ordinances that require ten
percent of newly constructed housing to be affordable.44  As expected, the
builders and real estate industries challenged the ordinances as regulatory
takings and exactions under federal and state constitutional law.45  But
courts have noted there is “no doubt that creating affordable housing for
. . . .  We find the distinction between the exercise of the zoning power
that is “directly tied to the physical use of the property” and its exercise
tied to the income level of those who use the property artificial in connec-
tion with the Mount Laurel obligation . . . .
Id. at 448–49 (citations omitted).
39. See id. at 448; see also Shepard v. Woodland Twp. Comm. & Planning Bd.,
364 A.2d 1005, 1012–13 (N.J. 1976); Taxpayers Ass’n of Weymouth Twp., Inc. v.
Weymouth Twp., 364 A.2d 1016, 1030 (N.J. 1976); DeSimone v. Greater Engle-
wood Hous. Corp. No. 1, 267 A.2d 31, 37 (N.J. 1970).
40. See Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 449.
41. See In re Egg Harbor Assocs. (Bayshore Ctr.), 464 A.2d 1115, 1123 (N.J.
1983) (quoting Hutton Park Gardens v. W. Orange Town Council, 350 A.2d 1 (N.J.
1975)).
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See, e.g., Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 351 P.3d 974, 977 (Cal.
2015); Home Builders Ass’n of N. Cal. v. City of Napa, 90 Cal. App. 4th 188,
191–92 (Ct. App. 2001) (noting “[c]ity [of Napa] . . . enact[ed] [an] inclusionary
zoning ordinance”).
45. See id. 195, 199 (rejecting takings and due process challenge because ordi-
nance advanced legitimate state interest, provided economic benefits to develop-
ers, and provided “administrative relief” to those who demonstrated lack “of any
reasonable relationship or nexus” under development exactions tests).
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low and moderate income families is a legitimate state interest” that passes
the substantially advances test46 and that inclusionary methods under zon-
ing ordinances increase the supply of affordable housing by requiring de-
velopers to provide housing at an affordable rate.47  In-lieu fee
requirements have also withstood regulatory takings challenges.48  It is un-
clear, however, whether a Penn Central “per se takings” challenge to inclu-
sionary zoning ordinances would suffice because “[t]he economic impact
would be mitigated by the regulatory relief offered . . . . [a]nd the impact
on distinct reasonable investment-backed expectations would be lim-
ited.”49  Thus, it would likely be deemed a justified effort by the munici-
pality “to balance economic benefits and burdens in order to serve the
general welfare.”50
The California Supreme Court opinion in California Building Industry
Ass’n v. City of San Jose51 is arguably the most decisively persuasive decision
on the legitimacy of inclusionary zoning under state constitutional law and
state zoning laws.  There, the San Jose ordinance required fifteen percent
of for-sale units to be affordable.52  The court found such a regulation to
be exactly that—a mere land use regulation that did not rise to an uncon-
stitutional exaction.53  The building industry’s attack was premised on a
theory of “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine that originated from the
Supreme Court’s Nollan and Dolan tests.54  The California Supreme Court,
46. See id. at 196.
47. However, some state courts have yet to invalidate an inclusionary zoning
ordinance as either a permanent physical occupation or a total taking under the
regulatory takings categorical tests. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 449 (1982); Fla. Home Builders Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Tallahas-
see, No. 37 2006 CA 000579, 2007 WL 5033524, at *5 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 20, 2007)
(“[T]he Ordinance does not allow the City or anyone else to encroach on a devel-
oper’s land.  The Ordinance only applies when a landowner voluntarily decides to
develop property in a certain manner.  A developer’s decision to develop in a man-
ner covered by the Ordinance is a voluntary act on the part of a developer.”). But
see Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031–32 (1992); Travis v. Cty. of
Santa Cruz, No. H021541, 2004 WL 2801083, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2004)
(holding ordinance was not unlawful regulatory taking because “conditions did
not deprive” owner of all economically-viable use of property).
48. See Holmdel Builders Ass’n v. Twp. of Holmdel, 583 A.2d 277, 295 (N.J.
1990); see also Home Builders Ass’n of N. Cal., 90 Cal. App. 4th at 197 (declining to
subject fees to heightened judicial scrutiny).
49. See Tim Iglesias, Framing Inclusionary Zoning: Exploring the Legality of Local
Inclusionary Zoning and Its Potential to Meet Affordable Housing Needs, ZONING & PLAN-
NING REP., Apr. 2013, at 1, 2.
50. See id. at 6; see also Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n, 351 P.3d at 996.
51. 351 P.3d 974 (Cal. 2015).
52. See id. at 978.
53. See id. at 1000–04.  The court found the in-lieu fee provision, an alterna-
tive option to the mandatory set-aside scheme, to be a valid exaction under certain
provisions of the Mitigation Fee Act. See id. at 996–1004.
54. See generally Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. Cal.
Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). Nollan and Dolan apply when a regulation
requires a private developer to dedicate a property interest for public use as a
condition to receiving a land use permit in a situation where it would be a taking if
9
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unpersuaded that an affordable housing requirement is an unlawful exac-
tion, noted that the conditions imposed by the inclusionary zoning ordi-
nance were valid only if the municipality produced evidence
demonstrating that the requirements were reasonably related to the ad-
verse impact on the municipality’s affordable housing shortages.55  But
the court reasoned that such inclusionary conditions are not exactions on
the developer’s property so as to bring into play the unconstitutional con-
ditions doctrine under the Takings Clause. Additionally, the condition
served the intended purpose of increasing the number of affordable hous-
ing units in a municipality “in recognition of the insufficient number of
existing affordable housing units” and “assur[es] that new affordable units
[ ] are . . . distributed throughout the city,” which is well within the police
power of zoning for health, safety, and general welfare.56  As other Califor-
nia state courts have determined, “there can be no valid unconstitutional-
conditions takings claim without a government exaction of property,” and
an ordinance requiring a set-aside number of affordable units in new de-
velopment “does not effect an exaction,” but is instead merely a land use
regulation subject to review under the police power standards.57
Even applied to Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District,58
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine recognizes real property inter-
ests, but monetary land use permit conditions in inclusionary zoning ordi-
nances are “at least somewhat ambiguous.”59  Thus, in places like
California, the Nollan and Dolan jurisprudence applies in inclusionary zon-
ing challenges only when the government “demand[s] the conveyance of
some identifiable protected property interest” to the government by the
developer for the public use “as a condition of [a land use] approval.”60
Inclusionary zoning seems to have survived the onslaught of regula-
tory takings challenges for the time being.  One wonders what the Su-
preme Court would make of a case like California Building Industry
Association.  Indeed, the nature of an ordinance that requires some below-
market units alongside market-rate units is not necessarily confiscatory be-
cause “the builder who undertakes a project that includes a mandatory set-
aside voluntarily assumes the financial burden, if there is any, of that con-
the government required the dedication of the property outside of the permit pro-
cess to serve its objective.  In Nollan, the property interest was an easement. See
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827–28.  In Dolan, it was a dedication of a strip of land in fee
simple. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 379.
55. See San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 111
(Cal. 2002); Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of Cent. Cal. v. City of Patterson, 171 Cal. App. 4th
886, 898 (2009).
56. See Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n, 351 P.3d at 979.
57. See id. at 988.
58. 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
59. See Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n, 351 P.3d at 990 (citing Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at
2599).
60. See id.
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dition.”61  Even in the absence of a state or federal subsidy to off-set the
below-market requirements, “those units may be priced low not because
someone else is subsidizing the price, but because of realistic considera-
tions of cost, amenities, and therefore underlying values.”62  The advent of
inclusionary zoning legislation provides ample parallels for how the exer-
cise of a similar police power under eminent domain codes may achieve
the same or substantially the same affordable housing results for locali-
ties—whether suburban or urban—struggling to construct or preserve af-
fordable housing.
III. INCLUSIONARY TAKINGS LEGISLATION
Just as zoning laws were creatively amended to spur affordable hous-
ing construction, eminent domain codes are likewise positioned to achieve
similar potential results.  The exclusionary effect of takings in low-income
communities is well documented and mirrors the same exclusionary ef-
fects of zoning.63  The seminal takings case, Berman v. Parker,64 is a primary
example of the exercise of eminent domain that excludes the poor from
new development.  Affordable housing was at the center of the debate in
Berman, where a D.C. state administrative agency exercised eminent do-
main for slum removal and prevention purposes.65  The Supreme Court
found that the broader definition of public use included taking property
that would benefit areas designated as slums.66  This conclusion arguably
gave municipalities carte blanche to take private property and convey it to
private entities as a public use under the guise of urban renewal.67  The
problem with Berman was that the housing originally promised by the local
government to replace the razed slum dwellings “were never substanti-
ated.”68  Indeed, eminent domain as a tool for displacement dates back to
the failed urban renewal era.69 Berman normalized the municipal practice
61. See Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d 390, 446 n.30 (N.J. 1983).
62. See id.
63. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 34–35 (1954).
64. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
65. See id. at 30, 34–35.
66. See id. at 36 (“It is not for the courts to determine whether it is necessary
for successful consummation of the project that unsafe, unsightly, or insanitary
buildings alone be taken or whether title to the land be included, any more than it
is the function of the courts to sort and choose among the various parcels selected
for condemnation.”).
67. See, e.g., id. at 30–31.  The municipality proposed the construction of af-
fordable housing for low-income families in an effort to convince the court that
the taking was justified for economic redevelopment purposes. See id. (noting de-
velopment plan for area “[made] detailed provisions for . . . [low cost] housing”).
68. See Keasha Broussard, Note, Social Consequences of Eminent Domain: Urban
Revitalization Against the Backdrop of the Takings Clause, 24 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 99,
105 n.51 (2000) (citing Denis J. Brion, The Meaning of the City: Urban Redevelopment
and the Loss of the Community, 25 IND. L. REV. 685, 730–31 (1991)).
69. See Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and
the Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 22–24 (2003).
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of designating property located within a “blighted” neighborhood as
“blighted,” even though the property did not show the ordinary signs of
blight.70
Even today, the notion of substituting old, debilitated housing with
new housing when clearing slums is a contentious matter.  This exclusion-
ary phenomenon causes a loss of affordable housing and subsequently dis-
places residents from one neighborhood to another.71  And similar to
exclusionary zoning, the effect of these types of condemnations excludes
the poor from wealthier neighborhoods.72  As Parlow notes, municipalities
“often use their power to raze” affordable properties “[b]y taking such
affordable housing [units] off the market by their exercise of eminent do-
main power.”73  Such abuse of eminent domain creates a cycle that “re-
duce[s] the available housing stock for low-income residents as such units
are usually replaced by new high-end commercial, residential, and mixed-
use projects.”74  This result occurs in light of the fact that municipalities
also fail to use the power to construct low-cost housing.  Why?
If a plot of vacant or abandoned land sits idle, then the municipality
has an incentive to lure commercial developers to negotiate the sale and
purchase of the land after condemnation in order to reap the tax-generat-
ing benefits of new development.  Affordable housing development, on
the contrary, may be unable to produce the same tax revenue benefits as
commercial development.  Taking private property for the public benefit
of affordable housing may simply be economically fruitless because the tax
benefits and rewards for the locality are minimal.  Thus, “cities will rarely
prioritize affordable housing projects above other development
projects.”75
In conceiving of takings legislation that might achieve similar housing
results as inclusionary zoning legislation, it is necessary to look specifically
to a prominent passage from the Kelo decision that gave way to one of the
most expansive state legislative reforms of constitutional property.  Justice
Stevens wrote:
We emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any State
from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings
70. See Berman, 348 U.S. at 34–35.
71. See Dana, supra note 2, at 8.
Exercises of what I am calling “exclusionary eminent domain” are doubly
exclusive because the displaced residents are unable to afford new hous-
ing in the same neighborhood or locality as their now-condemned, for-
mer homes.  In exclusionary eminent domain, low-income[ ] households
are excluded not only from their homes but also from their home neigh-
borhood or locality.
Id.
72. See id.
73. See Parlow, supra note 1, at 856.
74. See id. at 856–57.
75. Id. at 856.
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power.  Indeed, many States already impose “public use” require-
ments that are stricter than the federal baseline.  Some of these
requirements have been established as a matter of state constitu-
tional law, while others are expressed in state eminent domain
statutes that carefully limit the grounds upon which takings may
be exercised.76
In this passage, the Supreme Court cited the Michigan Supreme
Court’s decision in County of Wayne v. Hathcock77 for the proposition that
states could enact restrictions on eminent domain that were stronger than
that provided by the U.S. Constitution.78  For example, some states
amended eminent domain codes to exempt preexisting public uses from a
ban on takings for “economic development purposes”79 or to exempt
blight takings from the ban on economic development takings.80  Other
states reformed codes in keeping with urban redevelopment, prohibiting
eminent domain except when it is exercised for the purpose of “urban
renewal.”81  Some legislatures have redefined blight to include an area
that “retards the provision of housing accommodations or constitutes an
economic or social liability.”82  Further, “eleven state supreme courts have
invalidated economic development takings” under state constitutions.83
Some states also amended their constitutions to prohibit “the taking
of private property for transfer to a private entity for the purpose of eco-
nomic development or enhancement of tax revenues,”84 while some legis-
latures have limited the blight removal exception to takings for the public
purpose of removing “a threat to public health or safety caused by the
existing use or disuse of the property.”85  However, other states allowed
municipalities to retain the power to take private property for purposes of
“utility and infrastructure,” along with a “blight exception,” provided that
the municipality takes “without consideration of economic development
and revenue generation.”86  Likewise, other states explicitly legislated to
76. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489 (2005) (footnote omit-
ted) (citing California’s Health and Safety Code as example).
77. 684 N.W.2d 765 (2004).
78. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489.
79. See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.55.240(d) (West 2016).
80. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 523.271 (West 2016).
81. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1040(a) (West 2016).
82. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-18-3(c) (West 2016).
83. See Somin, Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings After
Kelo, supra note 1, at 187.  “These eleven states are Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Ken-
tucky, Maine, Michigan, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Washing-
ton.” Id. n.17.
84. See MICH. CONST. art. X, § 2; see also LA. CONST. art I, § 4(B); S.B. 1, 2006
Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2006); S.J. Res. E, 93d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2005).
85. See LA. CONST. art. I, § 4(B)(2)(c).
86. See Marc Mihaly & Turner Smith, Kelo’s Trail: A Survey of State and Federal
Legislative and Judicial Activity Five Years Later, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 703, 712 (2011).
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prohibit takings that “confer[ ] a private benefit on a particular private
party through the use of the property.”87
The legislative backlash against the expansion of eminent domain
showed a willingness on the part of state actors to thwart undesirable justi-
fications for taking private property, such as private-to-private convey-
ances.  Concerns for the health and safety of the community drove the
public sentiment about the increasing role of eminent domain in urban
areas, especially where middle-class homes were subject to takings, as evi-
denced in Kelo.  As local governments “struggle[d] to provide public ser-
vices with limited financial resources, governmental authorities [were]
encouraging more intensive economic development to generate addi-
tional tax revenue, to create new jobs and to jump start local
economies.”88
Proponents of the Kelo decision and legislative response range from
Richard Posner to John Roberts, both of whom noted that the backlash
was an example of private property rights being protected through the
political sphere and not relying on the judiciary to intervene.89  But critics
such as Ilya Somin disagrees with the notion that “judicial intervention [in
Kelo] may be unnecessary” to protect private property rights.90  Somin
posits that the legislative reform heralded by Posner and Roberts was com-
posed of merely “cosmetic” amendments91 because the reforms left blight
removal exceptions intact, giving municipalities carte blanche to condemn
private property under the veil of blight removal as a pretext for private
developers to engage in economic development.92  As a result, David Dana
87. See id. at 717 (quoting Tex. Gov’t. Code Ann. §2206.001(b) (West 2008)).
88. See Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 581 (Conn. 2004) (Zarella,
Sullivan, and Katz, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part), aff’d, 545 U.S.
469 (2005).
89. See Somin, Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings After
Kelo, supra note 1, at 244 (citing Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119
HARV. L. REV. 31, 98 (2005)).
90. See id.
91. See Somin, The Limits of Backlash, supra note 1, at 2103–04.
92. See NEV. CONST. art. I, § 22, cl. 1 (forbidding transfer of “any interest in
property taken in eminent domain proceeding from one private party to another
private entity”); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.55.240 (West 2016) (exempting preexist-
ing public uses declared in state law from ban on takings for economic redevelop-
ment); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-25-103(2) (West 2016) (defining “blighted
area”); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-101 (West 2016) (allowing takings for eradi-
cation of blight); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 73.014 (West 2016) (banning blight condem-
nations and economic development takings without mentioning that state has
substantially used law for blight condemnations); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 26-501b(e)
(West 2016) (limiting blight condemnations to instances where property is “unsafe
for occupation by humans under the building codes”); MO. REV. STAT.
§ 523.271(2) (West 2016) (exempting blight takings from ban on economic devel-
opment takings); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-2103, 18-2123, 76-710.04 (West 2016)
(exempting “blight” condemnations from ban on economic redevelopment tak-
ings); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 160A-503 (West 2016) (exempting blight condemna-
tions from restrictions on takings for public purpose of economic redevelopment);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 163.021 (West 2016) (allowing eminent domain of
14
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argues that the specter of exclusionary eminent domain remains a threat
to displacement of the poor from urban areas in light of blight removal
exceptions.
Takings for blight removal have been documented to disproportion-
ately target poor neighborhoods, thereby depleting the supply of afforda-
ble housing.93  As Justice Thomas noted in his Kelo dissent, eminent
domain takings for economic development or blight removal have histori-
cally impacted minority communities.94  Wendell Pritchett’s work on the
history of urban redevelopment and renewal substantiates Thomas’s
claim, showing that the poor have been disproportionately subject to dis-
placement and exclusion by blight removal condemnations.95  Somin and
Dana note that both economic development and blight removal takings,
taken together, victimize the poor because such condemnations tend to
target blighted neighborhoods more likely to be occupied by the poor,
rather than by wealthier, middle-class families.96  Somin notes, however,
that “post-Kelo reform has not noticeably exacerbated the problem [of dis-
placement]” and that reforms that allow blight condemnations to affect
some poor neighborhoods may be better than reforms that do not protect
any neighborhoods.97  The rationale behind this argument is that despite
middle-class neighborhoods yielding more in tax revenue compared to
poor neighborhoods—thus presumably making condemnation in middle-
class neighborhoods less attract to a municipality—the reality is that mu-
nicipalities will inevitably conclude that neither type of neighborhood
“yields nearly as much in tax revenue as compared with redevelopment
projects, if completed, that produce” a projected revenue increase that is
preferable to both options.98  But empirical research prior to Kelo evi-
dences that condemnation for urban renewal and urban development,
blighted areas for public uses if certain conditions are met); TEX. GOV’T CODE
ANN. § 2206.001 (West 2016) (exempting “blight” condemnations from ban on
economic development takings); UTAH CODE ANN. § 17C-1-202 (West 2016) (revis-
ing code to omit power given in previous version of code to use eminent domain
for blight alleviation or redevelopment); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1040 (West 2016)
(prohibiting eminent domain except when exercised for purpose of “urban re-
newal”); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-18-3 (West 2016) (exempting blight condemna-
tion from ban on economic development takings and defining blight to include
area that “retards the provision of housing accommodations or constitutes an eco-
nomic or social liability”).  As noted by Somin, these states “categorically forbid
virtually all economic development takings.” See Somin, Controlling the Grasping
Hand: Economic Development Takings After Kelo, supra note 1, at 187.
93. See Dana, supra note 2, at 22.
94. See id. at 12 n.9 (discussing dissent).
95. See generally Pritchett, supra note 69.
96. See generally Dana, supra note 1; Somin, Controlling the Grasping Hand, supra
note 1; Somin, Is Post-Kelo Reform Bad for the Poor?, supra note 1.
97. See Somin, Is Post-Kelo Reform Bad for the Poor?, supra note 1, at 1936.
98. See Carpenter & Ross, supra note 1, at 2451.
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nonetheless, had disastrous effects on poor and minority communities.99
Further, post-Kelo empirical research tends to confirm the concerns of Kelo
dissenters, Justices Thomas and O’Connor, evidencing “the disproportion-
ate effects of economic development takings on minorities and the
poor.”100  Justice Thomas relied upon this evidence and history to predict
that the majority’s decision in Kelo would “exacerbate these effects.”101
As Thomas Merrill has noted in his testimony before the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee, blight as a precondition for economic development tak-
ings seems designed largely to reassure the middle class that its property
will not be targeted for such projects, not to protect the very poorest com-
munities.102  If some blight is a requirement for a blight removal taking or
an economic development taking, then developers and municipalities will
be more likely to target revitalization efforts in poor and minority areas
instead of middle-class neighborhoods, where designating property as
blighted is more difficult to achieve.103  Indeed, the recent empirical re-
search by Carpenter and Ross on the effects of economic development
takings confirms well-established research on the link between urban re-
newal and redevelopment and poor displacement, thereby contradicting
the assertions of scholars who deny the exclusionary effects.104  The socio-
economic consequences of exclusionary condemnations on account of
low-cost housing has received less empirical attention, and thus far, schol-
arly commentary seems to suggest anecdotal evidence of a shortage of low-
cost housing as a result of economic development or blight removal
condemnations.105
Nonetheless, the aftermath of Kelo may actually have resulted in a per-
verse impact on affordable housing in dense urban areas because takings
for economic development or blight removal are likely to target low-in-
come neighborhoods and result in a shortage, not an increase, in low-cost
housing.106  Indeed, the post-Kelo legislative loopholes have played a sig-
nificant role in shaping landscapes for economic development, yet impos-
ing no obligations for affordable housing.  As Matthew Parlow notes, Kelo
99. See generally BERNARD FRIEDEN & LYNNE SAGALYN, DOWNTOWN, INC.: HOW
AMERICA REBUILDS CITIES (1989); JEANIE WYLIE, POLETOWN: COMMUNITY BETRAYED
(1989).
100. See Carpenter & Ross, supra note 1, at 2456.
101. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 522 (2005) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
102. See The Kelo Decision: Investigating Takings of Homes and Other Private Prop-
erty: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 14–16 (2005) (state-
ment of Thomas W. Merrill).
103. See Lynn E. Blais, Urban Revitalization in the Post-Kelo Era, 34 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 657, 676 (2007).
104. See Carpenter & Ross, supra note 1, at 2455–57.
105. See David A. Dana, Reframing Eminent Domain: Unsupported Advocacy, Am-
biguous Economics, and the Case for a New Public Use Test, 32 VT. L. REV. 129, 132,
133–34, 137, 142 (2007) (noting absence of empirical scholarship).
106. See id. at 131–33 (noting many scholars theorize that ban on takings to
cure blight will result in “less development . . . in poor urban areas”).
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did nothing to “stem the tide of affordable housing casualties of eminent
domain . . . . [and] many states have responded to Kelo by introducing
blight-only legislation that will ultimately reduce the availability of afforda-
ble housing.”107  Yet, even assuming that there is a lack of evidence that
post-Kelo reform did not cause greater displacement, it is arguably the case
that the reform measures did not address the exclusionary history of blight
condemnations, and therefore, the amendments did little to fight a prob-
lem that clearly existed and may still exist.108  At the very least, the prob-
lem of exclusionary takings poses as a serious threat to poor residents and
poor neighborhoods in light of blight exceptions and loopholes.  This “ex-
clusionary” phenomenon of eminent domain, like exclusionary zoning,
may require legislative treatment instead of doctrinal treatment to fend off
increased loss of affordable housing from economic development and
blight removal takings.109
To facilitate inclusive collaboration on affordable housing construc-
tion, elsewhere I have proposed the use of land assembly tools such as
“Community Benefits Agreements [ ], Land Assembly Districts [ ], Com-
munity Development Corporations [ ], Community Land Trusts [ ], Land
Banks [ ], and Neighborhood Improvement Districts” under “the concept
of inclusionary eminent domain.”110  Further, these tools “give[ ] private
developers, municipalities, and communities a more transparent set of
tools that guide the development process to reduce the phenomena of
displacing residents and decreasing the supply of affordable housing.”111
“Legislation in most states enables to some degree—but does not re-
quire or mandate—communities, municipalities, and private developers to
utilize” the inclusionary eminent domain tools for economic development
purposes.112  But nothing in the law today mandates this type of meaning-
ful engagement and collaboration in eminent domain takings for eco-
nomic development.113  The tools are voluntary, and if left unchecked,
the practice of inclusionary eminent domain may fail more often than
not.114  The failure of voluntary land use devices is readily apparent in
107. See Parlow, supra note 1, at 860 (citing several examples of “blight-only
[takings] legislation”).
108. See Dana, supra note 2, at 23 (“Eminent domain law, pre-and post-Kelo,
does not address the exclusion of low-income households as a distinct problem or
concern.”).
109. See id. at 22.
110. See Dickinson, supra note 3, at 847.
111. Id.
112. See id. at 888.
113. One notable exception is the Uniform Relocation Act (URA). See 42
U.S.C. §§4601–4655 (2012).  The Act, passed by Congress in 1970, establishes min-
imum standards for federally funded projects that displace persons from their
homes, businesses, or farms, and apply to the acquisition, rehabilitation, or demo-
lition of property for federally-funded projects.
114. See Dick Carpenter, Comment on Carpenter and Ross (2009): Eminent Domain
and Equity—A Reply, 48 URB. STUD. 3621, 3624–25 (2011).  Carpenter writes that
“[w]ithin the socio-political framework, we find it to be a naı¨ve notion that such
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zoning, where most voluntary inclusionary zoning ordinances, due to their
voluntary nature, “produce very few units.”115  Thus, mandatory zoning
programs became far more effective at creating affordable units.  Likewise,
giving legislative effect to inclusionary eminent domain may “result[ ] in a
more generous and definite commitment for the creation of new afforda-
ble housing.”116  As Dana noted shortly after the Kelo decision, there has
not been any action to enact laws to impose any legal requirements “de-
signed to alleviate the shortage of . . . affordable housing in urban ar-
eas.”117  Indeed, the complementary role of the legislature as a guardian
of the takings power requires further examination.118  Below is an exam-
ple of how an inclusionary takings statute might be framed.119
communitarian structures somehow ameliorate the downside effects of eminent
domain in redevelopment . . . . [and] CBAs . . . mak[ing] the process more be-
holden to powerful interests, not less.” Id.  These same sentiments appear in Rick
Hills and Michael Heller’s “land assembly districts” proposal, which would give
neighborhood property owners the power “to approve or disapprove” eminent do-
main takings. See Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 HARV. L.
REV. 1465, 1467–69 (2008) (arguing legislatures should adopt “land assembly dis-
tricts” to protect property rights).
115. See Bernard Tetreault, Arguments Against Inclusionary Zoning You Can An-
ticipate Hearing, NEW CENTURY HOUSING, Oct. 2000, at 17, 19–20; see also Barbara
Ehrlich Kautz, Comment, In Defense of Inclusionary Zoning: Successfully Creating Af-
fordable Housing, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 971, 982 (2002) (citing Marc T. Smith et al.,
Inclusionary Housing Programs: Issues and Outcomes, 25 REAL EST. L.J. 155, 164
(1996)) (stating voluntary programs are ineffective at producing units because de-
velopers have no incentive to participate); Benjamin Powell & Edward Stringham,
“The Economics of Inclusionary Zoning Reclaimed”: How Effective Are Price Controls?, 33
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 471, 475 n.25 (2005) (arguing failure of voluntary ordinances to
produce affordable units is due to “the very nature of the economics of inclusion-
ary zoning”).
116. See Dana, supra note 2, at 12.
117. See Dana, supra note 1, at 378–79.
118. See Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 581 (Conn. 2004)
(Zarella, Sullivan, and Katz, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part), aff’d,
545 U.S. 469 (2005).
119. Legal scholars once “bemoan[ed] legislation’s ‘second-class’ status as an
academic discipline.” See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Legislation
Scholarship and Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 691, 691
(1987).  However, other scholars argue that scholarly attention toward the law
from a legislative and statutory angle—or “legisprudential” viewpoint—is impor-
tant for understanding general theories of the law. See, e.g., HENRY HART, JR. &
ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICA-
TION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey eds., 1958); Julius Co-
hen, Legisprudence: Problems and Agenda, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1163 (1983); Julius
Cohen, Towards Realism in Legisprudence, 59 YALE L.J. 886 (1950).  Abbe Gluck is
one of the leading scholars to bring statutory interpretation and legislation from a
federalism-oriented lens to the forefront of legal scholarship again. See Abbe R.
Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and
the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750 (2010); Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Sch-
ultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congres-
sional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901 (2013). The
statutory proposal in this Article is merely a sketch or blueprint of how an inclusio-
nary takings statute might be framed.  Thus, the Author cautions that the inclusion-
ary takings statute proposed here is not meant to be lifted from the pages of this
18
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Prohibition of Eminent Domain for Economic Development and
Blight Removal.
(a) Prohibition.  Except as set forth in subsection (b), the exer-
cise of eminent domain by a condemning agency authorized with
such power is prohibited for the public purpose of economic de-
velopment, private enterprise, or blight removal.
(b) Exception.  A condemning agency may condemn private
property for the public purpose of economic development or
blight removal if it proves, by clear and convincing evidence,
adoption of an affordable housing plan through good faith nego-
tiations with affected landowners and a private developer, the
purpose of which is to ameliorate social and economic liability
within the condemned area.120
Section (a) implicitly acknowledges that economic development and
blight removal takings are constitutionally justifiable public purposes as a
result of Kelo.  However, this section also channels the post-Kelo reform by
statutorily prohibiting both types of takings except as permitted by Section
(b).  Thus, Section (b) is the inclusionary takings provision.  Reading the
two sections together, the state cannot undertake economic development
or blight takings unless it adopts an affordable housing plan that triggers
the construction of low-cost housing on the economic development site.
The bill or amendment, depending on the language of the existing emi-
nent domain code of the state, would provide an additional legislative
mechanism to trigger and enforce affordable housing construction.121  A
state legislative initiative, as opposed to a local municipal ordinance, is
arguably a stronger legal maneuver because there is well-established prece-
dent of state legislatures, rather than local governments, taking assertive
actions concerning land use decisions that shape urban environments.
Further, state legislatures are, for the most part, removed from the local
politics of local government that often inhibits adherence to land use
processes and procedures.
The inclusionary takings provision sets forth the conditions for which
the local municipality and private developer may exercise eminent do-
main powers, mandating some housing contributions on the newly con-
demned land designated for economic development or blight removal.
Article and inserted into legislative bills seeking to enact similar laws that trigger
housing construction through eminent domain codes, but carefully weighed and
considered—and perhaps tweaked according to the current state of affairs con-
cerning affordable housing supply in certain localities.  It is important, nonethe-
less, for legal scholars to think about both state and federal legislative changes to
achieve law reform in addition to traditional constitutional and doctrinal analyses.
120. This proposed “inclusionary takings” legislation was drafted by the Au-
thor and is not based on any particular state law.  However, as noted throughout
the Article, the proposed legislation would fall under an existing eminent domain
code, most of which provide language authorizing takings for specific public uses.
121. See Dickinson, supra note 3, at 876.
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The applicant seeking to exercise eminent domain—ordinarily a local mu-
nicipality, but potentially a developer—has a heightened burden to estab-
lish that the proposed exercise of eminent domain constitutes not only a
valid public use, such as economic development or blight removal, but
also that it negotiated in good faith with the affected community and land-
owners prior to pursuing condemnation.122
The affordable housing plan submitted during condemnation pro-
ceedings would likely require intricate details, including rate of af-
fordability, percentage of affordable units, and the location of those units
within the economic development project.  The underlying purpose of the
conditional provision would be to ensure that the municipality and devel-
oper provide details of the location of affordable housing construction
and that landowners and other residents affected are identified and pro-
vided access to the affordable housing units in light of displacement by the
taking.  It is possible that the municipality could forgo negotiations di-
rectly with the developer and craft the housing plan itself, setting forth its
own plan to allocate publicly-financed affordable units on the economic
development site.  However, given the lack of federal and state funding
available today for low-cost housing, it is more likely that the municipality
would encourage negotiations with the developer to help foot the bill.
The essence of the provision, broadly, is to address various underlying
public benefits beyond simply economic development.  Specifically, inclu-
sionary takings address concerns over the fair treatment of affected land-
owners located in the condemned area and require evidence of the
resources necessary for housing development and construction.  Further,
the submission of an affordable housing plan ensures that affected land-
owners and the general community understand and have knowledge of
the scope, breadth, and depth of the impact of the condemnation and
subsequent economic development project on their property.  This is all
in keeping with the police power to legislate for the health, safety, and
general welfare of the people.
The housing condition does not necessarily set a minimum percent-
age of affordable housing units like inclusionary zoning laws do, although
the provision could set a ceiling.  However, consistent with the innovative
density bonus and set-aside schemes used in inclusionary zoning, one
could imagine a state legislature requiring localities and developers to
conduct regional housing assessments as another condition before a mu-
nicipality initiates condemnation proceedings for economic development
122. Declarations of takings are ordinarily exercised by a municipality or dele-
gated urban development corporation.  However, the Dudley Street Neighbor-
hood Initiative in Boston is one “instance in the United States” of condemnation
authority being delegated by the state to non-profit organizations with the goal of
preserving affordable housing. See Amnon Lehavi & Amir N. Licht, Eminent Do-
main, Inc., 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1704, 1712–13 (2007) (noting Dudley Street exam-
ple is “the only instance in the United States” of such delegation of condemnation
authority).
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or blight removal.123  If there is a strong need for affordable housing
within the locality, then the municipality may be required to provide evi-
dence of higher percentages of affordable housing units.
The chief result of an inclusionary takings statute is that it goes be-
yond what inclusionary zoning could achieve in the context of community
collaboration and engagement with local municipalities, private develop-
ers, and landlords.  Inclusionary takings legislation essentially coerces mu-
nicipalities and private developers into building low-cost housing and
prohibits them from avoiding the responsibility for affordable housing
shortages, while simultaneously encouraging and facilitating a process
which most major land assembly projects should emulate—inclusionary
eminent domain.124
The proposed inclusionary takings statute effectively facilitates prac-
tice of inclusionary eminent domain through legislation by “en-
courag[ing] a constructive, three-way engagement process and
partnership among the community, private developer and municipality
where condemnation [looms].”125  As mentioned, “[i]nclusionary emi-
nent domain shows us how private developers and municipalities can rec-
oncile a development project in accordance with the needs and wants of
the affected community.”126  Indeed, “[e]minent domain takings should
temper and enable . . . economic redevelopment to flourish,” and this
process is normatively strengthened by legislation mandating municipali-
ties and private developers to work with affected communities.127
Take, for example, another tool of inclusionary eminent domain:
community land trusts.  Under the proposed statute, a municipality and
private developer could agree on structuring a portion of the condemned
land as a community land trust and offer the proposed community land
trust scheme as evidence of an affordable housing plan within the pro-
posed economic development project at condemnation proceedings.  The
agreement would allow for community members, who otherwise may be
displaced from the area, to have a property interest in the affordable hous-
ing development that sits above the land owned and operated by the com-
munity land trust.  The municipality or the land trust would have the right
of first refusal for purposes of sale so that the housing units remain afford-
able.  Again, the statute makes this possible because the conditions im-
123. See, e.g., Jared Brey, Diaz Stumps for Inclusionary Zoning to Expand, PLAN
PHILLY (Mar. 10, 2015), http://planphilly.com/articles/2015/03/10/diaz-stumps-
for-inclusionary-zoning-to-expand-affordable-housing [https://perma.cc/6EUL-52
TW] (“In some places, it’s mandatory: all new residential development requires
units to be set aside for people making some percentage of the Area Median In-
come (AMI).  In other places, it’s based on bonuses: developers can build beyond
what the site’s zoning allows if they set aside a certain portion of units for lower-
income residents.”).
124. See Dickinson, supra note 3, at 883.
125. See id.
126. Id.
127. See id.
21
Dickinson: Inclusionary Takings Legislation
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2017
156 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62: p. 135
posed on the municipality and private developer provide little choice but
to engage with the community and consider community land trusts,
among other things, as clear and convincing evidence of an affordable
housing plan.
Community benefits agreements (CBAs) are another example of
clear and convincing evidence that could be presented at condemnation
proceedings to successfully bypass post-Kelo restrictions or obtain condem-
nation approval for blight removal.  A municipality or authorized con-
demner who seeks to take blighted property could propose the creation of
a CBA with the affected landowners and broader community to replace
the lost housing and, more importantly, to satisfy the clear and convincing
evidence standard of the proposed statute.  The CBA would serve as the
tool for how inclusionary eminent domain operates throughout the statu-
tory requirements of the inclusionary takings process.  The agreement
would emphasize enforceability, accountability, transparency, and inclu-
siveness, and it becomes a legally-binding mechanism to help ensure that
low-income families and community members have a direct voice in the
decision-making process and planning of affordable housing in the new
economic development project born from the inclusionary takings stat-
ute.128  The CBA would likely be drafted with the support of “various com-
munity representatives” to leverage broad support and benefits for those
affected by the condemnation, particularly low-income minority
groups.129
The result of the agreement could be, for example, a fair share per-
centage of housing that would be constructed of up to fifty percent afford-
able housing.  Further, the agreement could permit the developer to rely
upon public subsidies.  However, relying on organic land assembly
processes to come to fruition in every economic development project is
naı¨ve.  It simply does not happen in every major development project.  In
fact, many of the best-known examples are probably outliers in the land
use and development process.
While most states have enacted “legislation [that] enables to some de-
gree” community benefits agreements or community land trusts, none “re-
quire or mandate” stakeholders in economic development projects
benefiting from condemned land to formulate an affordable housing plan
as a condition to instituting the taking.130  Therein lies the problem with
relying solely on organic land assembly processes.  They simply do not al-
ways result in equitable results without some legislative mandate.
128. See Mayor Bloomberg, Cornell President Skorton and Technion President Lavie
Officially Transfer 12 Acres of Roosevelt Island to Cornell Tech, NYC.GOV (Dec. 19, 2013),
http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/420-13/mayor-bloomberg-cornell-
president-skorton-technion-president-lavie-officially-transfer-12/#/0 [https://pe
rma.cc/7NRA-VTCE].
129. See Dickinson, supra note 3, at 888.
130. See id.
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Indeed, the basic idea of inclusionary takings is that if certain condi-
tions are met—namely a showing of an affordable housing plan—then the
local municipality and developer can bypass post-Kelo restrictions on eco-
nomic development takings or condemn for blight removal purposes.131
The proposed inclusionary takings statute is, in essence, a state-level con-
straint on the threat of exclusionary eminent domain.  As Parlow notes,
given the broad view of economic development takings expressed by the
Kelo Court, “one might expect to see more examples of cities taking pri-
vate property to meet the demand for affordable housing units.”132  Yet, in
the years shorty after Kelo, the legislative reform did not address takings
that impact low-cost housing, and pro-affordable housing provisions have
not been added to eminent domain statutes since then.
However, the proposed inclusionary statute does not make affordable
housing the sole public purpose of the taking, but instead complimen-
tary—or a condition—of the broader primary public purpose justification
of economic development or blight removal.  Both concepts of economic
development and blight removal are vague, and state legislatures have
maintained broad and general language to define those concepts under
eminent domain statutes.133  Most scholars are “reluctant” to identify eco-
nomic development takings “as one of the functions of . . . gentrifica-
tion.”134  However, the inclusionary takings statute would apply to broad
conceptions of blight removal and economic development takings in or-
der to capture a variety of exclusionary effects of eminent domain, includ-
ing those that condemn non-blighted property and those that condemn
131. Ohio’s eminent domain statute is an example of conditioning eminent
domain proceedings on the municipality meeting certain requirements. See OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 163.021 (West 2016) (allowing eminent domain of blighted ar-
eas for public use if certain conditions are met).  Ohio’s eminent domain code,
specifically § B(1), is similar to the proposed statute in this Article.  It places condi-
tions on the taking of private property for slum clearance or blight removal pur-
poses, such as the adoption of a comprehensive development plan.  The statute
reads:
(A) No agency shall appropriate real property except as necessary and for
a public use.  In any appropriation, the taking agency shall show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the taking is necessary and for a pub-
lic use.
(B) Before an agency appropriates property based on a finding that the area is a
blighted area or a slum, the agency shall do both of the following:
(1) Adopt a comprehensive development plan that describes the public need for the
property.  The plan shall include at least one study documenting the public need.
All of the costs of developing the plan shall be publicly financed.
(2) If the agency is governed by a legislative body, obtain a resolution
from that legislative body affirming the public need for the property.
Id. §§ (A)–(B) (emphasis added).
132. Parlow, supra note 1, at 853.
133. See George Lefcoe, After Kelo, Curbing Opportunistic TIF-Driven Economic
Development: Forgoing Ineffectual Blight Tests; Empowering Property Owners and School
Districts, 83 TUL. L. REV. 45, 59 (2008) (noting that “definitions of blight are [ ]
broad and vague”).
134. See Carpenter & Ross, supra note 1, at 2451.
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middle-class neighborhoods.135  It may be easier to convince legislators,
including those representing suburban localities, to pass an inclusionary
takings statute that applies only to major metropolitan cities.  However,
this proposal is a state-wide initiative encompassing suburban and urban
localities.
The application of inclusionary takings is naturally suited for “dense
urban areas” to fight a variety of exclusionary problems, such as gentrifica-
tion, segregation, and concentrated poverty.136  Yet, the proposal is also
useful for suburban localities.  As David Dana has noted, exclusionary tak-
ings occur in both the suburban and urban contexts.137  Indeed, poverty is
no longer solely concentrated in the inner-cities.  Suburbs are beginning
to show the kinds of physical, social, and economic indicators of decline
that many urban areas experienced in response to the urban exodus of the
1950s and 1960s.138  Further, many older suburbs are worse off than their
inner-city counterparts.139
In fact, inclusionary takings would be complementary to existing in-
clusionary zoning laws in localities that have enacted them.  The increased
commercial development and tax revenue from economic development
takings—with the condition of affordable housing attached—would substi-
tute the lack of tax revenue produced by housing development from inclu-
135. Empirical research is necessary to determine whether economic develop-
ment or blight removal condemnations cause increased gentrification.  Neverthe-
less, an inclusionary takings statute would apply to broad conceptions of economic
development and blight removal to mitigate direct displacement of poor families
occupying blighted or non-blighted units within the area targeted for condemna-
tion, alleviate the impact of high-priced development that would make voluntarily
constructing low-cost housing unattractive to the new developer, and ease the
threat of gentrification on surrounding areas adjacent or abutting the economic
development area.
136. See Dickinson, supra note 3, at 869.
137. See Dana, supra note 2, at 8–9.
138. See MARK BALDASSARE, TROUBLE IN PARADISE: THE SUBURBAN TRANSFORMA-
TION OF AMERICA 192 (1986); WILLIAM H. HUDNUT III, HALFWAY TO EVERYWHERE: A
PORTRAIT OF AMERICA’S FIRST-TIER SUBURBS viii (2003); PAUL A. JARGOWSKY, POV-
ERTY AND PLACE: GHETTOS, BARRIOS, AND THE AMERICAN CITY 92–114 (1997); W.H
LUCY & D.L. PHILLIPS, CONFRONTING SUBURBAN DECLINE: STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR
METROPOLITAN RENEWAL 4–10 (2000); MYRON ORFIELD, AMERICAN METROPOLITICS:
THE NEW SUBURBAN REALITY 28 (2002); Neil Smith et al., The “Camden Syndrome”
and the Menace of Suburban Decline: Residential Disinvestment and Its Discontents in Cam-
den County, New Jersey, 36 URB. AFF. REV. 497, 499 (2001); Thomas Bier, Moving up,
Filtering down: Metropolitan Housing Dynamics and Public Policy 7 (Brookings Inst. Ctr.
Urban and Metro. Policy, Discussion Paper, Sept. 2001).
139. See, e.g., ANTHONY DOWNS, OPENING UP THE SUBURBS: AN URBAN STRATEGY
FOR AMERICA (1973); DOLORES HAYDEN, BUILDING SUBURBIA: GREEN FIELDS AND UR-
BAN GROWTH, 1820–2000 (2003); DAVID LISTOKIN & W. PATRICK BEATON, REVITAL-
IZING THE OLDER SUBURB (1983); KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE
SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES (1985); George Sternlieb & Robert W.
Lake, Aging Suburbs and Black Homeownership, 422 ANNALS AM. ACA. POL. & SOC. SCI.
105 (1975).
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sionary zoning.140  Thus, as a practical matter, inclusionary takings
legislation enacted by state legislatures offers a more robust and broad
mechanism throughout a state because it would not be solely confined to
dense urban areas, but would also apply to sprawling suburbs that struggle
to provide avenues for affordable housing construction or that struggle to
utilize vacant, abandoned, and blighted property.  It is quite possible that
localities that have enacted inclusionary zoning ordinances and are re-
quired to provide a fair share percentage of low-cost housing on a regional
basis could supplement, or substitute, the need with housing created by
inclusionary takings.  In other words, a suburban municipality could
amend inclusionary zoning ordinances to allow the municipality to meet
some of its low-cost housing requirements through the units that are con-
structed from inclusionary takings.
The drawback, of course, is the specter of NIMBY-ism from suburban
locals who may be concerned with integration by virtue of expropriation
effects of inclusionary takings.  Like inclusionary zoning, long-time re-
sidents of relatively homogenous locales might protest local municipal ex-
ercise of inclusionary takings as an integration and low-cost housing
mechanism.  To combat such protestations, it is quite possible that elected
officials would justify inclusionary takings by noting that the primary focus
of the exercise of eminent domain is to tap into the tax-generating bene-
fits of economic development and the property-appreciating purpose of
blight removal, with class and race integration viewed as merely secondary.
One must remember that local elected officials want to keep their jobs,
and thus, dressing up inclusionary takings as a benefit for both the middle
class and the poor is essential.
William Fischel’s “homevoter theory” provides hypothetical evidence
that elected officials seeking to dress up integration as an economic bene-
fit for taxpaying homeowners would benefit from an inclusionary taking,
whereas inclusionary zoning does not necessarily provide the same tax and
job creation incentives.141  One could reasonably conclude that
homevoters would support inclusionary takings in the suburbs because in-
clusionary takings achieve several desirables for suburban homevoters who
would otherwise be skeptical of the law.  For example, inclusionary takings
identify vacant, blighted, or abandoned property, draw developers into the
locality, take undesirable property that threatens to decrease homevoter
property values throughout the suburban locality efficiently, generate tax
revenue from commercial development, and allow for the creation of
140. See, e.g., Phil Davies, Condemned Prosperity, FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINN.
(Mar. 1, 2006), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/fedgazette/con
demned-prosperity [https://perma.cc/Z3CX-PAFV] (“A persuasive case can be
made that eminent domain benefits communities by making it easier for local gov-
ernments to revitalize underutilized or blighted land-thereby raising property val-
ues, creating jobs and generating more tax revenue.”).
141. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 5–6 (2001) (dis-
cussing how local government decisions impact home values).
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more jobs.  A suburban locality and its homevoters receive all these bene-
fits in exchange for a mere percentage of affordable housing within the
economic development project.142
Alternatively, an inclusionary takings ordinance could be enacted by a
local city council, separate from state legislative action.  Concerns over the
construction of exclusively market-rate residential units on economic de-
velopment projects that exist as a result of blight removal or economic
development takings originates from general welfare principles of state
constitutional law—the Mount Laurel doctrine.  Many advocates of inclu-
sionary zoning raise this same concern when such ordinances are chal-
lenged in state court on regulatory taking or exaction grounds.  In other
words, a local inclusionary takings ordinance would target blight removal
takings resulting in economic development of exclusively market-rate resi-
dential units that fail to offer some low-cost housing.  The purpose behind
this more locally-tailored inclusionary takings ordinance would be to alle-
viate exclusively market-rate developments that are deemed to contravene
general welfare principles and under state constitutional law.
In light of the negative effect of socioeconomic segregation and the
positive impact of integration policies on low-income communities, exclu-
sively high-end residential development may be harmful to the health,
safety and general welfare in the zoning context.143  This principle of the
general welfare as a basis for prohibiting exclusively market-rate housing is
essentially the same as the public use requirement of promoting the pub-
lic welfare in takings, so long as the taking is rationally related to a conceiv-
able public purpose.  Blight condemnations, for example, have satisfied
public use doctrine because the eradication of blighted neighborhoods
and properties falls comfortably within the police power to act in further-
ance of the health, safety, and general welfare of the residents.144  As Au-
drey McFarlane has noted, Mount Laurel obligations of integration and
low-cost housing should be useful when municipalities condemn “in con-
nection with redevelopment.”145
Similar to the Mount Laurel doctrine’s implication of “developing”
municipalities’ zoning ordinances, a local government could conceivably
enact an inclusionary takings ordinance implicating any economic devel-
opment projects deriving from blight removal or economic development
takings to provide some below-market housing.  Of course, making this
maneuver at the local level has a caveat. Mount Laurel is a rare doctrine
142. See generally id.
143. See Cal. Building Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 351 P.3d 974 (2015).
144. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
145. See Audrey G. McFarlane, The New Inner City: Class Transformation, Concen-
trated Affluence and the Obligations of the Police Power, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 59–60
(2006).
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that imposes state-level constraints on land use and housing production
and few states, if any, have followed suit to the same degree.146
But if courts in the Mount Laurel context struck down exclusively or
disproportionately single-family residential zoning ordinances as violations
of basic general welfare principles of state constitutional law, then perhaps
local municipalities in the post-Kelo era are likewise equipped to restrict
exclusionary residential development—the same vein as inclusionary zon-
ing—that derive from blight removal or economic development takings by
mandating a certain percentage of low-cost housing built directly on the
economic development site.  Indeed, in the inclusionary zoning context,
this is a familiar principle.  Restrictions on the types of property that may
be constructed, such as commercial, residential, multifamily, or single
family, etc., are permissible so long as they bear a reasonable relationship
to the public welfare.  State constitutional general welfare principles could
and should be primary considerations in drafting an ordinance requiring
low-cost housing on economic development projects that exist as a result
of blight removal or economic development takings.  This would be a local
ordinance-like deviation from exclusionary eminent domain doctrine’s
state court power to directly restrict or deny municipal condemnations
where affordable housing shortages may result from a taking.  Of course,
city councils do not have that same judicial power, but they could conceiv-
ably regulate the resulting use of the development projects derived from
the taking.
However, as noted above, this Article focuses on a state legislatively-
led initiative, as opposed to a local municipal ordinance, as an arguably
stronger mechanism to trigger affordable housing and simultaneously
overcome post-Kelo restrictions on blight removal and economic develop-
ment takings attempted to skirt low-cost housing obligations.
But does inclusionary takings legislation withstand constitutional scru-
tiny like inclusionary zoning?  Does conditioning economic development
or blight removal takings on a commitment to affordable housing satisfy a
public use, and if so, does the law trigger other Fifth Amendment viola-
tions, such as exactions or regulatory takings?
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF INCLUSIONARY TAKINGS
The state action of what this Article refers to as “inclusionary takings”
is novel.  The proposed “inclusionary takings legislation” is also novel in
that it is an unexplored facet of the interplay between state legislation and
the Takings Clause.  The Supreme Court has not addressed whether regu-
latory takings or exaction challenges apply to state legislation regulating
eminent domain, and there are important questions regarding its suitabil-
146. See Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d 390, 490 (N.J. 1983) (requiring municipal-
ities to “provide[ ] a realistic opportunity for [ ] construction” of affordable
housing).
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ity as a justified public use that should be considered when thinking about
the practical application of inclusionary takings.
A. The Public Use of Inclusionary Takings
An important question regarding the constitutionality of inclusionary
takings is whether such takings are in furtherance of, and tailored to, a
public use that is the province of the legislature.147  The proposed statute
would seem to satisfy a public use because courts, by virtue of Kelo, already
give deference to such legislative determinations,148 and will not substitute
their judgment for that of the state legislature “unless the use be palpably
without reasonable foundation.”149  In the context of housing, state courts
upheld eminent domain statutes that authorized condemning agencies—
such as public housing authorities or urban development authorities—
with takings power.  Provided that the purpose of the taking was to amelio-
rate visibly distressed slums through urban renewal, courts upheld such
takings even if the primary underlying wedge was the construction of pub-
lic housing.  This same interpretation applies today.
Even in the post-Kelo era, state legislatures have kept blight removal
exceptions intact.150  Thus, large cities will likely redevelop depressed ar-
eas, and where redevelopment projects involve state or federal funding,
low-cost housing or relocation assistance is often required in the develop-
ment area.  However, a lack of federal funding for economic development
projects has created somewhat of a vacuum, where many major economic
development projects are driven by the private developer and available
equity; thus, the absence of federal funding relieves the developer of any
affordable housing or relocation obligations.151  In the event there is polit-
ical will to pass such a law, inclusionary takings legislation may fill the void
where courts have yet to apply “heightened review” when condemnation
razes existing low-cost housing.152
As noted in Part III, the inclusionary takings provision of an eminent
domain statute also does not permit takings solely for the purpose of con-
structing affordable housing.153  Low cost housing is complementary to
the broader goal of economic development.  The construction of afforda-
ble housing units by the developer is the wedge that satisfies the public use
justification of economic development.  Like public housing construction
as part of a larger slum clearance and urban renewal projects in the 1930s,
affordable housing construction, as part of a larger economic develop-
147. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239–40 (1984); Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. at 31–33.
148. See Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925).
149. See United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896).
150. See Parlow, supra note 1, at 860.
151. See id. at 860–61.
152. See Dana, supra note 2, at 23, 27.
153. See supra notes 69–75 and accompanying text.
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ment project or blight removal agenda, would likely satisfy the public use
requirement.154
Mandating a housing plan also seems reasonably justified as a legiti-
mate exercise of the state legislature’s power to protect affected landown-
ers from eminent domain abuse while, at the same time, asserting the
police power for the health, safety, and welfare of the community to miti-
gate exclusionary eminent domain.  Thus, it would stand to reason that an
inclusionary taking is constitutionally justified under the Fifth Amend-
ment Takings Clause as for the eminent domain takings vein of constitu-
tional property analyses because the statute is not forcing the municipality
and private developer to construct affordable housing outright, but in-
stead is conditioning its power to use eminent domain on such a require-
ment and trigger housing as an accessory or complimentary component of
the economic development project.
But while a court may accept the stated justification of a condition of
affordable housing as complementary to the broader economic develop-
ment project because it satisfies a public purpose, it is possible that a court
would question the municipality’s right—authorized by the inclusionary
takings statute—to advertise that, for a low cost housing concession, “it
would condemn land at the request of ‘private developers.’”155  Nicole
Garnett argues that cases where courts require that the government
demonstrate a connection between the challenged taking and the public
purpose used to justify it are more akin to a Nollan and Dolan heightened
review analysis because the courts are requiring the local municipality to
establish a “means-ends connection similar to that demanded by Nollan
and Dolan.”156  Indeed, it is quite possible that a court, faced with a chal-
154. See, e.g., Brammer v. Hous. Auth. of Birmingham, 239 Ala. 280 (1940)
(upholding statute authorizing public housing authority with power to condemn
and acquire private property to construct low-cost housing project.); Humphrey v.
City of Phoenix, 55 Ariz. 374 (1940) (upholding statute authorizing city exercise of
right of eminent domain to acquire sites for construction of low-cost housing
projects); Hous. Auth. of L.A. Cty. v. Dockweiler, 94 P.2d 794 (Cal. 1939) (uphold-
ing statute authorizing public housing authority power to condemn unsafe and
insanitary conditions by constructing low-rent housing projects and slum clearance
and public housing projects for low-income families are public uses); Marvin v.
Hous. Auth. of Jacksonville, 133 Fla. 590 (1938) (upholding statute authorizing
redevelopment authority power to condemn private property to clear slums and
construct low-cost housing projects and finding such authority satisfies public pur-
pose); Williamson v. Hous. Auth. of Augusta, 186 Ga. 673 (1938) (upholding stat-
ute conferring right of eminent domain upon housing authority as within power of
legislature and stating construction of low-cost housing is for public purpose which
affects general public); Krause v. Peoria Hous. Auth., 370 Ill. 356 (1939) (uphold-
ing statute authorizing housing authority power to acquire private property and
engage in low-rent housing and slum clearance projects).
155. See Sw. Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Nat’l City Envtl., 768 N.E.2d 1, 10 (Ill. 2002)
(finding that means by which development authority sought to advance public use
goals by advertising condemnation at request of private developer exceeded state
and federal constitutional limits on eminent domain power).
156. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Public Use Question as a Takings Problem, 71
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 934, 937 (2003).
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lenge to the inclusionary takings statute, “abandons rational-basis review
and require[s] the government” to show evidence of a connection be-
tween “the means by which it acquires land” to the public purpose of low-
cost housing construction for acquisition.157  However, as Garnett ac-
knowledges, courts have not yet made this doctrinal move.158  This raises a
second set of questions regarding the validity of an inclusionary takings
statute in the context of regulatory takings and exactions.
B. Inclusionary Takings as Regulatory Takings and Exactions
Regulatory takings usually involve “a specific parcel of real property”
with incentives built into its use through local regulations.159  In the hous-
ing context, some courts have found inclusionary zoning laws requiring a
certain percentage of units to be set aside for low-cost housing to amount
to a land use regulation instead of a regulatory taking or an exaction.160
Thus, challenges to these laws under the regulatory takings vein usually do
not succeed.161  Indeed, state courts have determined “no doubt that cre-
ating affordable housing for low and moderate income families is a legiti-
mate state interest,” passing the substantial advancement test and that
inclusionary methods under zoning ordinances “increase the supply of af-
fordable housing” by requiring developers to provide the housing at an
affordable rate.162  Inclusionary takings pose intriguing and complex
questions about the regulatory nature of imposing housing conditions on
developers under state eminent domain statutes as opposed to local zon-
ing codes.
157. See id. at 938.
158. See id.
159. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2597,
2599 (2013).  Further, “[w]here the permit is denied and the condition is never
imposed, nothing has been taken.” Id. at 2597.  The Koontz decision entitled land-
owners to challenge permit denials based on the Nollan and Dolan standards:
Extortionate demands for property in the land-use permitting context
run afoul of the Takings Clause not because they take property but be-
cause they impermissibly burden the right not to have property taken
without just compensation.  As in other unconstitutional conditions cases
in which someone refuses to cede a constitutional right in the face of
coercive pressure, the impermissible denial of a governmental benefit is a
constitutionally cognizable injury.
Id. at 2596.
160. See, e.g., Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 351 P.3d 974, 991
(Cal. 2015).
161. See Holmdel Builders Ass’n v. Township of Holmdel, 583 A.2d 277, 294
(N.J. 1990) (upholding mandatory in lieu fees as alternative to mandatory set-aside
of affordable units); S. Burlington Cty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Twp. of Mount Laurel (Mount
Laurel II), 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983) (upholding mandatory set-aside against regula-
tory taking claim).
162. See Home Builders Ass’n of N. Cal. v. City of Napa, 90 Cal. App. 4th 188,
195–96 (2001).
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1. Nollan and Dolan Exactions
Inclusionary takings may be shielded from the doctrinal vulnerability
of Nollan and Dolan exactions that threaten inclusionary zoning.  In Dolan,
the Court ruled that an “essential nexus” must exist between conditions
exacted by a municipality and the advancement of “legitimate state inter-
est[s].”163  Further, it ruled that exactions required by a municipality must
demonstrate “rough proportionality” to the impact of the proposed devel-
opment.164  Where a municipality’s condition attempts to impose a per-
manent easement, for example, on a landowner’s property without
sufficiently showing that the easement was necessary to advance a legiti-
mate state interest, the condition will be deemed an exaction in violation
of the Fifth Amendment.165  Likewise, in Nollan, the Court required an
essential nexus to exist between the “legitimate state interest” and the con-
dition exacted by the state.166  Thus, Nollan and Dolan established a
heightened standard for reviewing land use exactions and “special applica-
tion of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.”167  The burden of
proof, therefore, fell on the state to show that the standards are
satisfied.168
In the inclusionary zoning context, developers have challenged ordi-
nances on the grounds that they are exactions, and that courts should
apply rigorous heightened review established by Nollan and Dolan.  The
question for courts faced with such challenges is whether the ordinances
are designed to permit state agencies to apply “individualized ad hoc”
building permit determinations based on whether the developer concedes
to the affordable housing requirement.169  But because most inclusionary
zoning ordinances are adopted by local governments statutorily, it is un-
clear whether inclusionary zoning falls within the ambit of a typical exac-
tion because a legislative act imposes the condition broadly throughout
the locality for all new residential development, instead of imposing the
condition on an ad hoc basis by a planning commission.  The California
Supreme Court recently found that a residential inclusionary zoning ordi-
nance was nothing more than a “land use regulation” subject to the police
power standard of review, instead of heightened review under Nollan and
Dolan, because the ordinance’s purpose was to promote public goods
163. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 374 (1994) (citing Nollan v.
Calif. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987)).
164. See id. at 391.
165. See id. at 394–95.
166. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841.
167. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 547 (2005) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted).
168. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 n.8.
169. See Inclusionary Zoning: Legal Issues, CALIF. AFFORDABLE HOUSING PROJECT
& WESTERN CTR. ON L. & POVERTY (Dec. 2002), http://www.pilpca.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2010/10/IZLEGAL__12.02.pdf [https://perma.cc/VPQ3-MXLX]
(discussing takings challenges with respect to Nollan and Dolan).
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broadly, such as low cost housing, and disperse such housing throughout
the locality.170  However, the Court acknowledged that if an ordinance is
designed as a legislatively imposed mitigation fee, then it is possible that
the ordinance would require an exaction standard of review because the
fees would could be interpreted as a mechanism to mitigate the harm
caused by a particular new development.171  Inclusionary zoning ordi-
nances that frame the in-lieu fee requirement as an impact fee may also
run the risk of being invalidated as an exaction.172
It is not clear that Nollan and Dolan apply to eminent domain in the
inclusionary takings context because the landowner who is divested of the
property interest is paid just compensation by the government.  However,
hypothetically, if courts apply an exaction-like analysis, municipalities and
private developers would need to satisfy the essential nexus and rough
proportionality tests.  To do this, the municipality would have to craft a
housing plan in collaboration with the private developer to actually satisfy
and be roughly proportional and related to the goal of integrating the
economic development project with low-income families and producing
affordable units.  In conducting this analysis, it appears that an essential
nexus would exist between the housing condition being imposed and the
government’s goal of ameliorating the social and economic liability of a
particular area, especially as the condition seeks to benefit the health,
safety, and general welfare of low-income residents within the municipal-
ity.173  In the proposed inclusionary takings statute, the condition requir-
ing the submission of evidence of a housing plan essentially compels the
municipality and developer to craft a housing plan that satisfies the tests.
This condition is similar to the specifications required when landowners
or developers seeking a building permit submit development applications
agreeing to a certain percentage of low cost housing in exchange for ap-
proval in the inclusionary zoning context.
One salient point that deserves further exploration is the fine distinc-
tion between the role of a state legislature and the role of local municipali-
ties’ administrative agencies in the exaction context.  In the land use
approval and permitting process, state administrative agencies, such as
planning commissions, are the primary institutional players that either ap-
prove or deny a developer’s building permit.  These agencies make “indi-
vidualized determination[s]” as to whether the condition imposed in
exchange for a building permit “is related both in nature and extent to
the proposed development’s impact.”174  To obtain the building permit,
170. See generally Cal. Building Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 351 P.3d 974
(Cal. 2015).
171. See id. at 504.
172. See Holmdel Builders Ass’n v. Twp. of Holmdel, 583 A.2d 277, 287 (N.J.
1990).
173. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835 (stating “broad range of governmental pur-
poses” can constitute legitimate state interests).
174. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 375 (1994).
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the developer must satisfy requirements under the municipalities’ land
use and zoning apparatus, such as height restrictions, building type, and
use requirements and sometimes must satisfy conditions that exact certain
contributions to mitigate the impact of proposed economic development
projects.  However, in the inclusionary takings context, the state legisla-
ture is arguably not regulating the use of the land directly, but rather indi-
rectly.  In other words, it is the state legislature, instead of the local
municipality, that is regulating the acquisition, rather than the use, of the
land.175
The process of actually acquiring the land is subject to the condition.
The requirement to submit a housing plan is inserted into the statute as a
condition to initiate eminent domain proceedings, not to assign the prop-
erty to a particular use.  These conditions must be met in order for the
municipality to be able to initiate eminent domain proceedings.  While
the submission of a housing plan in court as part of the eminent domain
proceedings is similar to the submission of a building permit to a zoning
officer or development application to a planning commission, the optics
are different.  There are key differences between state legislation that reg-
ulates eminent domain to trigger affordable housing construction and the
adjudicative procedures that administrative agencies employ to exact low-
cost housing contributions from developers.
Unlike inclusionary zoning, which is enabled by state legislatures
through its zoning powers but enacted by local municipalities, inclusionary
takings conditions are nestled within a statute enacted by the state legisla-
ture.  The state legislature, in other words, is not an administrative agency
tasked with the power to make individualized determinations of land use
permits, zoning appeals, variance requests, and special exceptions and
cannot assess impact mitigation.  In those land use situations, the state,
through its local administrative agencies, is concerned with the use to
which the property will be put, whether it conforms to existing uses,
whether the project affects a non-existing use, and its potential impact on
land use regulations.  This is a crucial distinction that effectively removes
an inclusionary takings condition from the scope of the land use process
and shields the condition from being categorized as a land use regulation,
thereby potentially protecting an inclusionary takings statute from exac-
tion challenges.
The Supreme Court has not decided whether legislatively-enacted
conditions are subject to an exactions test, and state courts are at odds on
whether to apply the standard to state legislation that imposes an exaction
on a developer or landowner.  While Dolan did not address the distinction
between adjudicative and legislative exactions, it did, however, note that
“land use regulations . . . differ in two relevant particulars” from the typical
175. For an example of such authority being exercised by the state legislature
as demonstrated in a proposed inclusionary takings statute, see supra note 120 and
accompanying text.
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landowner seeking a building permit.176  Legislative determinations may
“classify[ ] entire areas of the city.”177  For example, zoning codes divide
and separate various uses into districts throughout a municipality, whereas
local administrative agencies “ma[de] adjudicative decision[s] to condi-
tion [a landowner’s] application for a building permit on an individual
parcel.”178  This is an important point that divides states and has not been
addressed by the Supreme Court.179  Even Justice Thomas, in a dissent
denying certiorari in Parking Association of Georgia, Inc. v. City of Atlanta,180
noted that “[t]he lower courts are in conflict over whether Dolan’s test for
property regulation should be applied in cases where the alleged taking
occurs through an [a]ct of the legislature.”181  Justice Thomas went fur-
176. See Dolan 512 U.S. at 385.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See Home Builders Ass’n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993,
1000 (Ariz. 1997) (holding that “[b]ecause the Scottsdale case involves a generally
applicable legislative decision by the city, the court of appeals thought Dolan did not
apply”).  The Arizona Supreme Court agreed with this point, but noted that “the
question has not been settled by the Supreme Court.” See id. (citing Parking Ass’n
of Ga., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 450 S.E.2d 200 (Ga. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1116
(1995)); see also Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 698 (Colo.
2001) (holding that Nollan and Dolan heightened review does not apply to legisla-
tion effecting impact fee exaction). But see Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R. Corp. v. South
Dakota, 236 F. Supp. 2d 989, 1027 (D.S.D. 2002) (holding that legislative nature of
exaction “does not mean that a regulatory takings analysis is the wrong framework
for this case”); Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 447 (Cal. 1996) (“[I]t is
not at all clear that the rationale (and the heightened standard of scrutiny) of
Nollan and Dolan applies to cases in which the exaction takes the form of a generally
applicable development fee or assessment—cases in which the courts have de-
ferred to legislative and political processes to formulate ‘public program[s] adjust-
ing the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.’”
(alteration in original) (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104, 124 (1978))); Amoco Oil Co. v. Vill. of Schaumburg, 661 N.E.2d 380,
386–92 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (applying Nollan/Dolan analysis to legislative land-dedi-
cation requirement); J.C. Reeves Corp. v. Clackamas Cty., 887 P.2d 360, 365 (Or.
Ct. App. 1994) (citing Dolan, 512 U.S. at 383) (applying both Nollan and Dolan tests
to legislation that imposes exactions and noting that “[t]he nature, not the source,
of the imposition is what matters”); Schultz v. City of Grants Pass, 884 P.2d 569,
572–73 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385) (stating that “the
character of the restriction remains the type that is subject to the analysis in Do-
lan”).  The Schultz court then relied upon Dolan as drawing a “distinction between
the legislative land use decisions that are entitled to a presumption of validity and
the exactions that are not.” Id. at 573.  Relying on the Supreme Court, the court in
Schultz “noted that what triggers the heightened scrutiny of exactions is the fact
that they are ‘not simply a limitation on the use’ to which an owner may put his or
her property, but rather a requirement that the owner deed portions of the prop-
erty to the local government.” Id. (quoting Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385); see also Sparks
v. Douglas Cty., 904 P.2d 738, 746 (Wash. 1995) (holding road dedication require-
ment reviewable under Dolan).
180. 450 S.E.2d 200 (Ga. 1994).
181. See Parking Assoc. of Ga., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 515 U.S. 1116, 1117
(Thomas & O’Connor, JJ., dissenting).  Justices Thomas and O’Connor would
have heard the case on appeal. See id. at 1116–18 (Thomas & O’Connor, JJ., dis-
senting).  Justice Thomas further elaborated, stating:
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ther, stating that “[i]t is not clear why the existence of a taking should turn
on the type of governmental entity responsible for the taking.”182  He
analogized “a city council [that] can take property just as well as a plan-
ning commission can” and that “the general applicability of the ordinance
should not be relevant in a takings analysis.”183  Thomas argued, “[t]he
distinction between sweeping legislative takings and particularized admin-
istrative takings appears to be a distinction without a constitutional differ-
ence.”184  Thus, whether an inclusionary takings statute would be struck
down as an exaction is unclear, but it seems unlikely because the proposed
statutory condition falls outside the land use approval process and there-
fore is arguably not a land use regulation or governmental exaction sub-
ject to Nollan and Dolan.  This shields inclusionary takings from most of
the doctrinal vulnerability that threatens inclusionary zoning.  However, as
noted above, if courts were to make the doctrinal move of invoking Nollan
and Dolan’s heightened review of condemnations as part of the public use
test, then inclusionary takings could conceivably be struck down.  Courts
could potentially view such inclusionary condemnations as no more than
an advertisement to land shop directed at developers, who then request
the municipality condemn the land in exchange for a commitment to
some affordable housing construction on the condemned land.
Lastly, the inclusionary takings statute encourages a “three-way en-
gagement . . . among the [affected landowners], private developer and
municipality.”185  As discussed above, CBA’s are one of many land assem-
bly tools that could be utilized to plan and prepare the affordable housing
plan required for submission at condemnation proceedings to overcome
the clear and convincing evidence standard.  The CBA could be submitted
as evidence of such a plan and would likely trigger many of the elements
of inclusionary eminent domain, such as collaboration with the affected
landowners, collaboration, and negotiation.  However, the invocation of
the agreement in the inclusionary takings context raises exaction ques-
tions, particularly if the agreement runs afoul of the local land use
processes and other issues involving contract zoning and subdivision exac-
tions.  When analyzed separately, particularly the “good faith negotiations”
It is hardly surprising that some courts have applied Dolan’s rough pro-
portionality test even when considering a legislative enactment.  It is not
clear why the existence of a taking should turn on the type of governmen-
tal entity responsible for the taking.  A city council can take property just
as well as a planning commission can.  Moreover, the general applicability
of the ordinance should not be relevant in a takings analysis . . . .  The
distinction between sweeping legislative takings and particularized ad-
ministrative takings appears to be a distinction without a constitutional
difference.
Id. at 1117–18.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1118.
184. Id.
185. See Dickinson, supra note 3, at 883.
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and the “affordable housing” condition set forth in section (b) of the pro-
posed statute, the concern over exactions and unconstitutional conditions
become clearer.
Vicki Been has raised concerns over the validity of community benefit
agreements that impede local land use approvals processes and whether
such agreements withstand legal challenges.186  This concern is partly due
to the fact that administrative agencies, planning commissions, and zoning
boards are already subordinate to a state’s regulatory apparatus.  It is ques-
tionable then whether an agreement that sets forth a promise by the devel-
oper that twenty percent of the residential units constructed on the
economic development site will be below-market at fifty percent of the
area median income has an essential nexus or rough proportionality to
the impacts of the development.  If the agreement between the municipal-
ity, developer, and affected community allows for the developer to skirt his
housing obligation, then the agreement may run afoul of the inclusionary
takings statute, raising a slew of local-state conflict between regulations
and contract law.  The problem here is that there is a dearth of literature
or case law on the legality of the state entering into an agreement that
exacts affordable housing contributions from private developers.
However, a cursory review of exactions as related to community bene-
fits agreements does not necessarily raise the specter of Nollan and Dolan
challenges striking down the proposed law.  First, affected landowners and
the municipality do not voluntarily need to convince—or coerce—a devel-
oper to enter into a CBA.  The inclusionary takings statute, imposed by the
state legislature, already requires the developer to engage with the munici-
pality in some manner to adopt a housing plan in order to benefit from
the taking.  Second, a CBA would be confined to the goals set forth under
the inclusionary takings statute, such as collaborating to design a housing
plan for submission at the condemnation proceedings.  Lastly, as men-
tioned above, because the CBA would be entered into prior to the devel-
oper or municipality having any property interest in the condemned land,
the benefits that flow from the agreement would probably not take effect
until the condemnation proceedings have concluded and the land has
been conveyed to the developer.  At that point, the developer has already
agreed to the benefits and has fulfilled his or her statutory obligation.
Further, the extent of the community benefits agreement raises questions
that are unanswerable here.  If the CBA focused strictly on the details of
the affordable housing plan, such as “a certain percentage of affordable
units to be constructed,”187 the affordability rate of each unit, and the
number of layered subsidized housing within the development, such as
Section 8 or low-income housing tax credits, then it is unlikely that the
186. See Vicki Been, Community Benefits Agreements: A New Local Government Tool
or Another Variation on the Exactions Theme?, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 5 (2010).
187. See Dickinson, supra note 3, at 886.
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agreement would not pose as an exaction threat for the property interest
reasons stated above.
2. Koontz’s Monetary Exaction and Permit Denial
Koontz, likewise, may pose as an obstacle for inclusionary takings be-
cause the Court, rather illogically, found that permit denials constitute
takings under Nollan and Dolan when the landowner rejects the govern-
ment’s demand that the landowner agreed to an exaction.188  Unlike cer-
tain conditions for below-market units frequently found in inclusionary
zoning laws—which are subject to regulatory takings and exaction
claims—inclusionary takings mandate only an affordable housing plan as a
condition to be met to effect an eminent domain taking successfully.
While the requirement of a housing plan would cause the developer and
the municipality to expend some money and resources, the condition is
not an outright monetary demand per Koontz.  Further, even if some ex-
penditure of money and resources resulted in preparation of the housing
plan, this expenditure is not that different from money and resources
used to prepare building permit applications, development rights applica-
tions, or zoning variance applications in the land use approval process.
The developer is going to have to traverse those land use permitting and
building processes anyways.
Hypothetically, if a court denied the municipality its eminent domain
powers because it did not meet the clear and convincing standard of an
affordable housing plan, per the provisions set forth in the proposed in-
clusionary takings statute, it is possible the law would trigger a Koontz exac-
tion because some condition is being imposed.  For example, if the private
developer rejects the municipality’s demand to prepare an agreement on
affordable housing or fails to successfully negotiate the agreement that the
developer accede to an exaction in the form of an affordable housing
plan, then under Koontz it is possible that a court could find a taking for
the developer.  Likewise, denying the municipality the power to exercise
eminent domain as a result of the developer’s rejection of the affordable
housing condition may also trigger an unconstitutional exaction.  The
problem with these scenarios, however, is that the link between an identifi-
188. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2603
(2013).  The landowner filed an application for permits to dig and construct wet-
lands for commercial development. See id. at 2592.  The management district,
however, required that the landowner “offset the resulting environmental damage”
in order to obtain permission. See id.  The landowner proposed “a conservation
easement on [the] portion of his property” that he did not plan to develop. See id.
at 2593.  The management district was not satisfied and proposed several alterna-
tives. See id.  The landowner refused to comply with the alternative options for
offsetting the environmental impact. See id.  As a result, the management district
denied the landowner’s application, stating that without satisfactory mitigation,
the landowner failed to meet the standards necessary for approval. See id.  The
landowner filed suit, arguing that the permit denial failed the “essential nexus”
and “rough proportionality” tests. See id.
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able property interest and an exaction in the inclusionary takings context
is tenuous.
Neither the municipality nor the private developer has any identifi-
able property interest when the inclusionary takings provision is triggered
at the time condemnation proceedings commence.  The only property in-
terest is that of the affected landowner whose property is threatened by
the prospect of the taking, but who presumably has been justly compen-
sated.  Thus, it is difficult to see how a court would find an unconstitu-
tional exaction under Koontz because the developer and the municipality
do not have a property interest in the condemned land.  On the contrary,
in Koontz, Nollan, and Dolan, the landowners already had a fee simple inter-
est in the affected land.  In those cases, the landowners were simply seek-
ing approval to develop certain portions of the land pursuant to local land
use approval processes.  Lastly, unlike inclusionary zoning, with respect to
inclusionary takings, the state is essentially expending some of its own re-
sources to meet its fair share affordable housing.  How?  In order to trig-
ger affordable housing construction, the municipality must (1) prepare a
housing plan prior to condemnation in collaboration with the private de-
veloper and (2) pay just compensation to the landowner whose land it is
seeking to condemn.
3. Loretto’s Permanent Physical Occupation
An inclusionary takings statute may trigger a permanent physical oc-
cupation.189  It is well-established that “a permanent physical occupation
[of property] authorized by government is a taking without regard to the
public interests that it may serve.”190  Indeed, requiring a landowner to
grant, for example, “an easement outright” presents a physical occupation
and most likely a taking.191  Some courts have also found that requiring a
landowner to grant a public easement in order to obtain rezoning of prop-
erty “involve[d] a physical taking rather than a regulatory one.”192  Still, it
is unlikely that the proposed statute gives rise to a permanent physical
taking.  As discussed above, the timing of ownership is key.
While the statutory conditions under inclusionary takings may argua-
bly provide for the permanent physical occupation by way of the require-
ment to set aside portions of the condemned land for affordable housing
for the public benefit, the conditions do not apply to any property interest
or right of the local municipality or private developer at the time the ap-
plicants seek approval to condemn.  In other words, the forfeiture of a
189. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441
(1982) (holding that statute allowing cable company to place permanent cable
facilities on landowner’s property is taking because it constitutes “a permanent
physical occupation of property”).
190. See id. at 426.
191. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); see also Dolan v.
City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
192. See McKenzie v. City of White Hall, 112 F.3d 313, 317 (8th Cir. 1997).
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property interest before the local municipality and private developer even
acquire an interest in the property does not establish a taking of a perma-
nent physical nature.
Essentially, the property interest must be recognizable under the law
to have a compensable takings claim.  The municipality, instead, is being
compelled by the state legislature to come before the courts to request the
right to exercise eminent domain and acquire the property in condemna-
tion proceedings.  Thus, compelling the municipality to engage with a pri-
vate developer to strike an agreement to show clear and convincing
evidence of an affordable housing plan as a condition that must be met
before the exercise of eminent domain is unlikely a permanent physical
occupation.
4. Lucas’s Total Taking
Unlike the landowners in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,193 a
developer subject to an inclusionary taking statute is unlikely to be subject
to a total taking.194  Inclusionary takings do not bar, restrict, or limit a
private developer from constructing certain structures on the condemned
land, but merely regulate his or her ability to benefit from takings for eco-
nomic development or blight removal.  The proposed statute accom-
plishes this task by requiring the developer and municipality to meet
requirements of affordable housing construction.  Indeed, the affordable
housing condition does not deprive the private developer of all “economi-
cally viable use” of the condemned land once it is conveyed from the tak-
ing because the developer does not hold any property interest in the land
at the time condemnation proceedings begin; rather, the statute merely
regulates the municipalities’ power to institute condemnation proceed-
ings and does not deprive the developer of “economically viable use” of
the land.195
The private developer can still engage in significant development on
the economic development site that makes the use of the property eco-
nomically viable once a municipality obtains approval to condemn the
land.  Once a property interest is recognizable, the developer has carte
blanche to develop and profit, subject to land use approvals and subject to
an obligation to build affordable housing pursuant to the agreement with
the municipality.
193. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
194. See id. at 1019, 1063 (holding that barring landowner from constructing
habitable structures on land after landowner purchased it can constitute taking
because it “denies [the landowner] economically viable use of [ ] land” (quoting
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980))).
195. See id. (discussing consequences of requirements that do not permit
landowner to enjoy “economically viable use of [ ] land”).
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5. Penn Central’s Ad Hoc Test
Even Penn Central’s ad hoc test does not seem to pose significant hur-
dles to inclusionary takings.196  The affordable housing conditions are ar-
guably exacted before the local municipality receives approval to
condemn and proceeds to take, acquire, and transfer the property interest
to the private developer.  The burden of affordable housing price restric-
tions, if any, is not triggered until after the private developer has acquired
the condemned property and construction begins and is completed.  Fur-
ther, prior to acquiring the land, the private developer has presumably
already agreed—by way of a community benefits agreement or commit-
ment to creating a community land trust—to provide affordable housing.
Thus, the Penn Central test is unlikely to apply or be of consequence be-
cause the private developer’s “investment-backed expectations” are not
troubled enough to rise to a regulatory taking prior to or after condemna-
tion proceedings commence.197
V. CONCLUSION
It is important to acknowledge that the statutory proposal has never
been empirically tested or modeled in accordance with housing market
areas of suburban or urban localities.  Nonetheless, the framework pro-
posed could be considered as a starting point for many state legislatures
seeking new and innovative avenues to provide affordable housing for low-
income families in dense urban areas (particularly in light of the new ur-
banism movement), push back against the specter of gentrification, and
ameliorate the phenomenon of exclusionary eminent domain.
It is important to note that if a state legislature enacted the proposed
statute it would not necessarily treat all housing shortages adequately or
integrate urban or suburban neighborhoods completely.  The proposal
does, however, serve as an example of one of many potential resolutions to
affordable housing shortages and how state legislatures can utilize the
Fifth Amendment takings powers to advance police power authority to
serve the health, safety, and general welfare of poorer residents
threatened by the prospect of exclusionary eminent domain.
196. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 136–38
(1978) (holding that designating landowners’ train station historical landmark is
not taking because it “does not interfere in any way with the [land’s] present uses”
or prevent landowner from “obtain[ing] a ‘reasonable return’ on its investment”).
197. For a discussion of investment-backed expectations, see Daniel R.
Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations: Is There a Taking?, 31 WASH. U. J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 3 (1987).
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